Guidelines for the adaptation of the TETRA educational programme at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University to address human behavioural issues by Fouche Nico Pieter
 Guidelines for the Adaptation of the 
TETRA Educational Programme at 
the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University to Address Human 
Behavioural Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.P. FOUCHÉ 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme at Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University to Address Human Behavioural Issues 
by 
Nico Pieter Fouché 
s207057396 
 
Dissertation 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
MAGISTER TECHNOLOGIAE 
in 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
in the 
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING, THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
of the 
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
 
Supervisor: Dr Kerry-Lynn Thomson 
Co-Supervisor: Dr Johan van Niekerk 
 
December 2012  
Page | i  
 
Abstract 
 
Information is a vitally important asset to organizations and the information should be 
protected to sustain the value it provides to the organization. Information is 
transferred via different mediums in these organizations. An example would be 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio or TETRA, which is utilized within organizations to provide 
a technically very secure form of digital radio communication. 
TETRA is a communications technology that is currently being successfully used 
throughout the world for secure, reliable and robust critical communication. TETRA is 
used by Public Safety and Security (PSS) and transportation sectors, amongst 
others. PSS includes police officers, fire marshals and emergency medical units who 
require protected and accurate information that could influence decisions that could 
make difference between life and death.  
The TETRA educational programme offered by the TETRA Academy at the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU), educates TETRA users in various aspects 
of the TETRA standard. TETRA is viewed as a technically very secure 
communication standard, as it utilizes security features such as mutual 
authentication, air interface encryption, end-to-end encryption, jamming detection 
and ambience listening, amongst other security techniques to ensure that the 
information traversing through the network is kept secure. The TETRA educational 
programme material includes many physical and technical controls to assist TETRA 
users in protecting information. However, to what extent does the TETRA 
educational programme address operational controls?  Operational controls address 
what is often referred to as the weakest link in information security – human 
behavioural issues.    
Humans can be exploited through human manipulation attacks, which include social 
engineering and bribery. Therefore, this study argues towards adapting the TETRA 
educational programme offered at the NMMU to address these human behavioural 
issues. 
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1 Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the topic of the dissertation, provides background information of 
the problem area and clearly stipulates the delineation. 
 
“Despite our intellect, we humans - you, me, and everyone else – remain the most 
severe threat to each other's security.” – Kevin Mitnick 
 
1.1. Prologue 
Information is one of the greatest sources of value in organizations today. Information 
can be viewed as a continuous flow of data that is required in most areas of an 
organization. The flow must be protected to sustain the value it provides to 
organizations. A common practice is to never spend more on safeguarding an asset 
than what its value is worth. However, it is difficult to determine the value of information, 
which makes it difficult to determine how much safeguarding it requires (Straub, 
Goodman, & Baskerville, 2008, p. 92). Consider a loss of information in a brokerage 
firm, for example. This could result in multiple stock brokers losing investments, 
effectively losing money and organizational value. Also consider the Public Safety and 
Security (PSS) sector of our society where a loss of information could influence 
decisions that could mean the difference between life and death. Therefore, as 
information is so important, it must be ensured that data is protected at all times to 
sustain or increase the value of an organization. 
Information is actively exchanged within an organization through various mediums. 
These mediums allow interaction between devices and humans. This exchange should 
be protected using information security controls, namely: physical controls, technical 
controls and operational controls. Physical controls are commonly in the form of locked 
security gates or patrolling guards to provide physical protection. Technical controls 
involve the use of devices, such as firewalls, to prevent unauthorized access in or out of 
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a network. Operational controls attempt to control the human aspect of information, 
using education and policies (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, p. 8; Von Solms, 2000). 
Operational controls are dependent on human actions and behaviours within an 
organization. Typically, attacks on information assets are directed at the weakest link to 
increase the chance of success. Therefore, information assets are only as secure as the 
weakest link; and the human factor is often considered the weakest link (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002, p. 3). 
Various mediums exist which are used in the transportation of information. These 
mediums include, but are not limited to, hand written or printed paper, speech, cable in 
computer networks, and radio waves. 
There are two types of radio networks, namely broadcast and two-way. Broadcast radio 
networks are of a one-way nature, where people can only listen to the broadcasted 
communication, for example, a frequency of a local radio station. Two-way radio 
networks allow human interaction between people within the distance of the pre-defined 
frequency. For example, in the Public Safety and Security (PSS) sector police officers 
and paramedics require specific information from dispatchers such as the location of an 
emergency. Two-way radio networks are also used by wildlife officers, civil services or 
in the daily operation of organizations (Silver, 2005, pp. 43-44). 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) is one of the mediums used today for radio 
communication. TETRA is an international standard for secure digital transmission of 
information over radio networks. Further, TETRA is a digital radio network that conforms 
to the requirements of a Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) system (Stavroulakis, 2007, 
pp. 5-10). The network revolves around a digital two-way transceiver, using Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) to allow multiple encrypted speech channels for 
communication that can be both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint and allows digital 
data to traverse simultaneously (Stavroulakis, 2007, pp. 102-104). TETRA introduces 
improvements from the traditional analog radio system to the digital radio system. 
Improvements include the integration of voice and data communication and the sharing 
of a single network amongst multiple different users. A later chapter will thoroughly 
discuss the TETRA network and operation. 
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TETRA is widely adopted by organizations all around the world. According to the 
TETRA Industry Group, 121 countries were estimated to be using TETRA network 
solutions at the end of 2010 (Consultancy, 2011). In 2011, the regulatory changes in 
United States of America and Canada, which had previously limited the usage of 
TETRA, now permit TETRA to be deployed all over the world. To mention a few 
examples, Germany has a nationwide adoption of TETRA for the PSS which include the 
police, fire brigade, ambulance and coastal guard under the organization BOSNET. The 
United Kingdom is complete with the full-roll out of TETRA networks for the police, fire 
brigade, emergency services and armed forces under the organization Airwave. In 
South Africa, TETRA was used by the Eastern Cape Police for secure digital 
communication, and to ensure Public Safety and Security, in the Nelson Mandela Bay 
Stadium during the FIFA 2010 Soccer World Cup. The full roll-out of the TETRA 
network solution is still underway in the rest of South Africa. 
As mentioned previously, information is exchanged in organizations over various 
mediums. A TETRA network, using radio communication, allows for the exchange of 
information and provides human interaction over great distances. For example, a 
handheld TETRA terminal user communicates with a dispatcher to exchange 
information. The TETRA users exchange the information in the form of an electronic 
packet over the radio waves of a TETRA network. In a TETRA network, just as in most 
communication networks, humans are potentially the weakest link when it comes to the 
protection of information. 
 
1.2. Problem Background 
The goals of humans are generally focused around money, social advancement and 
self-worth (Microsoft, 2006). These goals drive people to certain actions in order to 
achieve those goals. Depending on the goals of an individual, actions may include 
malicious or illegal activity. For example, an individual may attempt to exploit the 
physical, technical and/or operational controls of an organization‟s Information 
Technology (IT) network for personal gain. Exploitation of physical controls includes 
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lock-picking and illegal entry. Exploitation of technical controls includes the use of 
hacking tools, network worms and disabling techniques (such as Denial of Service) to 
bypass technical controls in a network. Human manipulation attacks exploit operational 
controls and include, for example, bribery and social engineering attacks, which is the 
manipulation of human beings involving the divulging of sensitive information (Microsoft, 
2006). 
Many IT networks could be considered technically very secure. These IT networks have 
the latest devices to ensure security by preventing unauthorized access and hardware 
encryption modules for superior confidentiality inside the network. As IT networks can 
be technically very secure, the target of exploiting the IT network has shifted from 
attacking technical controls to attacking the users of the IT networks in order to bypass 
highly sophisticated security techniques (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, pp. 3-4). 
Hackers utilize various human manipulation attacks to encourage or convince victims to 
release sensitive information, thereby circumventing physical and technical controls. 
Hackers can use social engineering techniques or exploit corrupt employees within the 
organization. Social engineering includes, but is not limited to, Intimidation, Persuasion, 
Ingratiation and Assistance (Microsoft, 2006). Intimidation involves the impersonation of 
an authority figure while using mild to serious threats to force the victim to meet the 
hacker‟s needs. Persuasion is the act of influencing a victim by means of clever 
argumentation or false reasoning. Ingratiation is a longer term attack, where the 
attacker forms a relationship with the victim and gains trust while encouraging the victim 
to divulge information. Assistance is a technique where the hacker attempts to assist a 
victim and, upon success, a short term relationship is created which could lead to an 
opportunity for divulging information. Hackers use one or more of these techniques to 
gain access to information which they are not authorized to view (Microsoft, 2006). In 
addition to social engineering attacks, where employees may not be aware that they are 
divulging information, certain employees may be vulnerable to bribery. Employees who 
could be corrupted through bribery are usually dissatisfied with their working 
environment or wish to increase their self-worth by having more money. Hackers or 
opposition of the organization could attempt to bribe dissatisfied or disgruntled 
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employees to divulge information (Easttom, 2011, p. 225). Information Technology is 
thus often vulnerable to human manipulation attacks, despite strong technical security 
controls. 
Similarly, TETRA digital networks also utilize many technical security controls, such as 
End to End encryption, Mutual Authentication and Air Interface Encryption. TETRA is a 
technologically secure form of communication, with little room for technical exploitation. 
However, just as hacking in the IT computer network environment has shifted from 
technical hacking to human manipulation attacks; it can be argued that a TETRA 
environment could be subject to the same human manipulation attacks as IT networks.  
In IT environments, information security Awareness, Training and Education 
programmes are often used to attempt to educate users about typical human 
manipulation attacks for increased security of the IT computer networks. The TETRA 
educational programme offered at the TETRA Academy at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University focuses primarily on the technical aspects and operation of 
TETRA networks, and is aimed at TETRA network designers and users. The NMMU 
TETRA educational programme consists of four courses, namely; the End User System 
(EUS) course, Radio Unit Operating (RUO) course, TETRA Base Station (TB3) course 
and Dispatcher Work Station (DWS) course. It can be argued that, just as information 
security awareness, training and education are needed in an IT computer environment, 
so too are they needed in a TETRA environment to guard against human manipulation 
attacks. This would attempt to ensure that the users of the TETRA networks are aware 
of potential human manipulation attacks. 
Protection against the exploitation of the human factor is not considered in the 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) educational programme, which could lead to a 
breach in the secure communications of TETRA infrastructures. 
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1.3. Research Questions 
How should the current TETRA educational programme offered at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University (NMMU) be adapted to address the vulnerabilities posed by the 
human factor? 
The subject will be investigated and the following secondary research questions will be 
answered: 
 How susceptible are TETRA networks to human manipulation attacks which are 
currently posing risks in the IT environment? 
 To what extent does the current TETRA educational programme at the NMMU 
address security issues? 
 What countermeasures are used in the IT environment to address the human 
factor? 
 Are countermeasures, used in the IT environment, applicable in addressing the 
human factor in TETRA networks? 
 
1.4. Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this research project is to suggest guidelines towards 
addressing the human factor in the TETRA educational programme offered at 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 
The secondary objectives include: 
 Investigate susceptibility of TETRA networks to human manipulation attacks 
commonly used to exploit vulnerabilities in IT environments. 
 Investigate the extent to which the current TETRA educational programme at the 
NMMU addresses security issues. 
 Investigate countermeasures currently addressing human factors in IT 
environments. 
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 Evaluate the applicability of identified countermeasures used in the IT 
environment, in addressing the human factor in TETRA networks. 
 
1.5. Significance of the Study 
Currently, the TETRA educational programme used at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University does not address countermeasures to human manipulation attacks in a 
TETRA environment. As mentioned previously, the loss of information can cause 
organizations to lose value. In TETRA networks, the organization using the network 
could also lose value if information is lost or corrupted. Further, a loss of information in 
TETRA networks used for Public Safety and Security (PSS) could have a more severe 
penalty, as a loss of information could result in a loss of life. Human manipulation 
attacks, within these organizations where human interaction is prevalent, are of critical 
importance when designing and maintaining security. 
During the FIFA 2010 Soccer World Cup the Eastern Cape police used a TETRA 
network to satisfy safety and security needs during the event. Further, a TETRA 
Training Academy has been established at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
(NMMU) in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. This is the only TETRA Training Academy of its 
kind, internationally, where the TETRA educational programme is integrated into a full-
time degree programme. This provides the researcher with access to the TETRA 
educational programme material (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2011).  
Social engineering techniques and corruption have been used extensively in the IT 
environment to exploit the human factor (Winkler & Dealy, 1995). This dissertation will 
investigate the susceptibility of TETRA networks to human manipulation attacks. The 
TETRA educational programme could then be adapted for delivery at the NMMU to 
include material addressing human behavioural issues. 
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1.6. Research Process 
Research is a common search for knowledge. Another definition is a scientific and 
systematic search for pertinent information on a specific topic (Kathori, 2008, p. 1). The 
following research is directed towards Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA). 
Various types of research exist, of which Quantitative and Qualitative are most 
common. Quantitative research is based on the measurement of quantity or amount. It 
is applicable to phenomena that can be expressed in terms of quantity (Kathori, 2008, p. 
3). Qualitative research is based on the phenomena of quality. This relates to the 
interest in investigation of human behaviour. The approach used for qualitative research 
deals with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour (Kathori, 2008, p. 
3). Qualitative research was used in this dissertation. 
Utilizing qualitative research techniques, a Literature Study was conducted to 
investigate TETRA. A Literature Study is a critical overview based on facts that have 
been discovered before concerning a particular subject matter, as described by Hofstee 
(2006). The study will be aimed at TETRA network aspects, security aspects and usage 
locally as well as worldwide. Using Qualitative Content Analysis, the various TETRA 
course materials, as provided by EADS to the NMMU, will be qualitatively investigated 
and analysed to provide evidence of the extent to which security issues are addressed. 
This qualitative research will provide interpretations of the content and will utilize quotes 
from the analysed literature into the findings, which will support the researcher‟s 
argument (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 87-88). 
A list of possible human manipulation attack variations will be constructed, which 
involves possible human manipulation escalation scenarios for TETRA environments. 
This list will be based on common IT deception scenarios and adapted to fit the TETRA 
environment. The attack scenarios will be presented to a panel of TETRA experts to 
record their opinions on the susceptibility of TETRA networks. The feedback from the 
TETRA experts will be collected and combined to incorporate the entire panel of 
experts‟ opinions and this combined information will be redistributed again to the panel 
of experts to allow reconsideration of opinions. This process can continue for multiple 
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rounds of collating the experts‟ opinions and redistributing them back to the experts, 
which is known as a Delphi technique (Linstone & Turoff, 1975, p. 3). 
A secondary Literature Study will be conducted after the Delphi technique and 
Qualitative Content Analysis. The study will aim at possible countermeasures that are 
currently available to address the human factor in IT environments. The secondary 
Literature Study output will be analysed and the applicability of identified 
countermeasures in the IT environment will be argued for TETRA relevance using 
Argumentation. The output of the Argumentation will be in the form of guidelines which 
will be argued to adapt the current TETRA educational programme at Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University. The proposed guidelines will be verified using the qualitative 
research technique of Elite Interviews. Elite Interviews include the examination and 
critique of programme plans, such as proposed guidelines for training programmes, by 
selected people who are knowledgeable in a relevant content area, such as qualified 
TETRA experts (Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 2011). 
The following list summarizes the research process: 
 Literature Study – investigate current issues and countermeasures 
 Qualitative content analysis – investigate possible exploitation issues in TETRA 
 Delphi technique – investigate susceptibility of issues for TETRA 
 Argumentation – argue applicability and guidelines 
 Elite Interviews – verification of proposed guidelines 
 
1.7. Scope and Delineation 
The research will focus on the human or operational aspects of TETRA and will 
investigate to what extent the human factor is addressed in the TETRA educational 
programme used by the TETRA Academy at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University. It is anticipated that these results could be generalized. However, this could 
be argued in future research.  
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1.8. Layout of Chapters 
The layout of chapters is displayed in Figure 1.1 with a description of each chapter 
below the figure. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
Chapter 2: 
Terrestrial 
Trunked Radio
Chapter 3: The 
Human Factor of 
Information 
Security
Chapter 4: 
Research 
Methodology
Chapter 5: Output 
and Suggestions
Chapter 6: 
Guidelines
Chapter 7: 
Conclusion
 
Figure 1.1: Layout of Chapters 
The chapters indicated by Figure 1.1 will discuss the following: 
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Chapter 1: Introduction - the first chapter is an introduction, which provides 
background information of the problem area, outlines the research objectives and 
clearly stipulates the delineation. 
Chapter 2: Terrestrial Trunked Radio - this chapter provides an in-depth overview of 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio as a means of digital communication. The user components, 
network components and network architecture, along with security measures, will be 
discussed. 
Chapter 3: The Human Factor of Information Security - this chapter elaborates on 
operational security in the information security environments. This chapter discusses 
core information security characteristics, controls, attacks, and human behaviour.  
Chapter 4: Research Design - this chapter states the structure within which the 
research was conducted. This chapter discusses the research process, literature 
review, qualitative content analysis, the Delphi technique, argumentation and Elite 
Interviews. 
Chapter 5: Output and Suggestions - this chapter elaborates on the Delphi technique 
and qualitative content analysis research techniques. The usage and findings of the 
research techniques are reported in this chapter. 
Chapter 6: Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to 
Address Human Behavioural Issues - this chapter proposes guidelines for the 
highlighted issues from the qualitative content analysis and the Delphi technique. The 
guidelines will be aimed at the TETRA educational programme offered at Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University. The guidelines will be evaluated by utilizing Elite 
Interviews. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion - the final chapter provides a conclusion and will evaluate the 
research to determine whether the research objectives have been met.   This chapter 
will also include a discussion for further research. 
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1.9. Conclusion 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) has the potential to provide improved digital 
communication that conforms to the Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) standard for one 
of the most vital taskforces in South Africa, namely the Public Safety and Security (PSS) 
sector. In most organizations, a loss of information could result in a loss of value for that 
organization. A loss of information in TETRA, however, could result in the loss of life in 
emergency situations.   
As TETRA is considered technically very secure, this loss of information could be as a 
result of the unpredictable human factor. In IT environments, information security 
Awareness, Training and Education programmes are used in an attempt to address the 
possible exploitation of the human factor. Currently, the TETRA educational programme 
used at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University does not address the possibility of 
human factor exploitation, which could result in a breach of security. Therefore, it is vital 
that research is conducted to address this issue. 
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Chapter 2: Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
This chapter provides an in-depth overview of Terrestrial Trunked Radio as a means of 
digital communication. The user components, network components and network 
architecture, along with security measures, will be discussed. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
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Information 
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Research 
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“It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity” – 
Albert Einstein 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Human nature strives to be better. People are constantly striving to progress in their 
unique situations, whether it is learning something trivial, such as how to use a spoon, 
or as strenuous as successfully managing a massive company. One of the 
requirements of this progress is grasping and utilizing information (MIT, n.d.). 
Information can thus be viewed as an asset, which needs to be protected in varying 
degrees depending on the importance of the information. Users and developers of 
information are responsible for the method, strength and philosophy of the protection of 
this information. In other words, they create the security posture (Cobb, 2003, p. 1). 
Security posture is identified as a composition of technical and non-technical policies, 
procedures and controls (Shinn, 2008). The posture includes, for example, the way 
organizations handle customers, control employee social security numbers or even how 
often anti-virus applications are updated. The posture can be assessed and various 
shortcomings can be identified in the usage for a particular organization. However, an 
organization‟s security posture is typically incomparable to other organizations, as 
numerous differences exist and the security posture should be tailored to match the 
needs of the organization (Cisco, 2012). 
The different mediums used for information transfer also influence the security posture. 
Even though many transfer mediums exist, the scope of this dissertation will investigate 
a radio medium used for critical information transfer in the Public Safety and Security 
(PSS) sector; namely Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA).  
The objective of this chapter is to introduce TETRA in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of this technology.  TETRA will be discussed in the context of the TETRA 
Release 5.5 documentation, provided by Cassidian, and used by the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University (NMMU) as course material.  The various devices that operate 
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within a TETRA network will be discussed, as well as the architecture and operation.  
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of TETRA security features.   
 
2.2. Radio Technologies 
Einstein refers to technology as an entity which sustains people‟s needs, sometimes 
even more than required. In radio communications in the modern information age, there 
are substantially higher requirements of technology in daily tasks, to an extent where 
multiple radio technologies are actively transferring information in various frequency 
spectrums, forming part of a vast network of wireless communication. These radio 
technologies include, but are not limited to, Global Standard for Mobile Communications 
(GSM), Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT), Universal Mobile 
Telecommunication System (UMTS) and Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA). These 
technology standards have been developed and implemented throughout the last two 
decades in various countries using various spectrums (Roelofsen, 2000).  
Much progress has been made in the radio communication field.  TETRA is an example 
of this progress as radio technology has progressed from legacy analog radio to the 
digital Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) category. TETRA is currently assigned specific 
frequencies, which are decided and adopted by the regulator of the country. The 
European Union has deemed all Public Safety and Security (PSS) to be allocated the 
380-400 MHz frequency band. Other countries may use it differently, such as China 
using the 800MHz frequency band (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 11). TETRA 
digital PMR networks offer various functions and features that were not previously 
available in analog radio. These include Integrated Voice and Data Communication, 
together with Multiple User Organizations sharing a Single Network (EADS Defence & 
Security, 2008b, p. 12). Integrated Voice and Data Communication allows packets 
containing data and speech to traverse the network simultaneously, while Multiple User 
Organizations sharing a Single Network allows various organizations like the police and 
fire brigade to coexist in the same digital radio network in the same physical area 
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independently. TETRA functions and features will be discussed in further detail in the 
next section. 
 
2.3. Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
TETRA is a communications technology that is currently being used throughout the 
world for secure, reliable and robust critical communication. The standard was 
developed in the 1990s by European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). 
TETRA is considered a set of open standards for secure digital radio communication, 
which is mainly used by the Public Safety and Security (PSS) and transportation 
sectors. TETRA is also considered the first truly open international standard for 
communication over digital radio (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 11).  
The following figure represents the TETRA standard and how it relates to other 
manufacturing organizations that have adapted the standard to better conform to their 
needs or even to improve standard features of TETRA. 
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Figure 2.2: TETRA Standard Interoperability (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, p. 10) 
Figure 2.2 represents the main TETRA standard and how other vendors have added to 
or modified the TETRA standard to match industry needs. The core TETRA standard is 
shown as the circle in the middle of the figure. Using the TETRA standard as the core, 
the EADS implementation is represented in the figure as the blue circle, while other 
vendors are represented by the red circle.  The TETRA Release 5.5 documentation of 
EADS details the information for the blue circle in Figure 2.2, which is currently the 
course material used at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU). As 
previously mentioned, the EADS course material will be discussed throughout the 
dissertation.  
TETRA provides a specification for new Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) networks. 
The TETRA network has general characteristics which are similar to a cellular network, 
but possesses unique characteristics such as security through End-to-End Encryption 
(E2EE), field control through a dispatcher and trunking (switching) capabilities. These 
characteristics create an “autonomous telecommunications system”, which is distinct 
from cellular networks (Stavroulakis, 2007, p. 1). TETRA also includes aspects for 
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future implementation and improved infrastructure through, for example, TETRA 
Enhanced Data Service (TEDS). TEDS will provide high speed data to the network 
through utilizing different radio frequency channel bandwidths and will provide TETRA 
users with up to 691 kb/s (TCCA, 2012a; TCCA, 2012b). However, the TEDS service is 
an improvement to the TETRA standard and is still being altered for future 
implementation.  
TETRA requires very specific equipment to function properly. The equipment is 
manufactured by multiple vendors, such as Motorola and EADS, all of which conform to 
the standards of TETRA (Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2012). The equipment of TETRA will 
be further discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Additionally, the following section, Section 
2.4, will discuss an overview of TETRA, including TETRA network devices and an 
overview of TETRA communication. 
 
2.4. Terrestrial Trunked Radio Overview 
To fully understand TETRA, the components, features, and operation of a TETRA 
network must be considered. This section attempts to provide a clear understanding of 
TETRA by discussing a brief overview of the standard. The overview will provide 
illustrations to better comprehend the network, components, and operation thereof.  
As mentioned previously, the TETRA Release 5.5 documentation of EADS will be used 
throughout this chapter, as it is used as the course material for TETRA training at the 
NMMU. The course material is required to answer a research question of this 
dissertation, which is to what extent TETRA addresses security issues; therefore it is 
discussed in detail in this chapter.  
There are three types of users in a TETRA network, namely; user, dispatcher and 
administrator. A TETRA user in the field could use one of the various types of TETRA 
terminals to communicate to other TETRA users within the organization or dispatchers 
in the organization. A dispatcher in the organization handles communication requests 
from TETRA users in the field, emergency calls from TETRA users in distress, and 
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transfers connecting calls to other users in the TETRA network. An administrator in the 
client organization configures the TETRA terminals, DWSs and various settings for 
communication in the client organization. The administrator also monitors logs and 
activities in the TETRA network. 
Various sectors use TETRA for their communication needs, such as the police, fire 
brigade, transportation and construction. A TETRA service provider will have clients, 
which will use the TETRA infrastructure of the provider. The client will usually be 
required to own some of the devices, such as TETRA terminals and/or Dispatcher Work 
Stations (DWS). Each sector, however, does not need to own an independent TETRA 
infrastructure, as a TETRA service provider can allow multiple sectors to use one 
physical TETRA network concurrently. This is achieved by the service provider 
allocating virtual domains to clients, which are known as organizations. The TETRA 
service provider can allow multiple organizations to access the TETRA network 
independently. The clients will communicate only to employees within their organization, 
unless a dispatcher contacts a dispatcher from another organization to transfer a 
connecting call. For example, a police officer, who is a member of the police 
organization, can connect to a dispatcher who then transfers the call to a dispatcher in 
the fire brigade organization. 
The following subsections provide an overview of both the TETRA network, as well as 
the communication within a TETRA network.  
 
2.4.1. TETRA Network Overview 
A TETRA network uses various devices to allow communication to traverse 
through the coverage area. The devices used in the network can be manufactured 
by various vendors, but all conform to the open TETRA standard. The vendors can 
potentially add features, which are not specified in the TETRA standard, to 
promote to clients and potentially increase sales for the vendor. The devices are 
used by TETRA users of the organization to fulfil their communication needs. The 
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following figure represents a small TETRA network that provides coverage to a 
relatively small area. 
 
Figure 2.3: TETRA Network Overview 
There are four core devices within a TETRA network which are essential to 
facilitate communication traffic, namely: TETRA Terminals, TETRA Base Stations 
(TBS), Digital Exchanges for TETRA (DXT), and Dispatcher Work Stations (DWS). 
These devices are represented in Figure 2.3 with the indicators „A‟, „B‟, „C‟, and „D‟, 
respectively. „E‟ represents the communication uplink and downlink from the 
terminals to the network. This illustration is considered a relatively small TETRA 
network due to the single TBS used for coverage and the single building housing 
the DWSs. Typically, a TETRA network will comprise many TBSs to provide 
coverage for, possibly, a nationwide communication network and multiple buildings 
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connecting the TETRA service provider central building to the clients‟ dispatcher 
buildings. 
The TETRA terminals are used by TETRA users of an organization for 
communication, which can be done with various TETRA terminal devices. The 
TETRA terminals can be used for handheld, mobile and data purposes, which will 
be discussed in Section 2.5 in further detail. The TETRA terminals send uplink 
traffic to the TBSs and receive downlink traffic from the TBSs during 
communication.  
The TBSs are placed in specific geographic areas to provide coverage for the 
TETRA users with TETRA terminals. As mentioned previously, the TBSs send 
downlink traffic to the TETRA terminals and receive uplink traffic from the TETRA 
terminals. As seen in Figure 2.3, the TBSs are physically connected to DXTs 
which send synchronization traffic between the TBSs and DXTs. The 
synchronization is required to monitor that the TBSs are operational and that traffic 
can flow between the TBSs and DXTs. When an employee communicates with a 
dispatcher via the radio link between the TETRA terminal and the TBS, the traffic 
is passed from the TBS to the DXT, through a multiplexer to the DWS of a 
dispatcher. One of the options when a TBS connects to a DXT is an E1 
connection. A multiplexer is used between the DWSs and the DXT, as the DWS 
devices cannot utilize an E1 interface and the multiplexer allows multiple DWSs to 
be connected to the same E1 connection to a DXT. TBSs will be discussed in 
Section 2.5 in further detail. 
The DXT is an exchange device that is typically connected to multiple TBSs. As 
mentioned previously, when traffic is sent to dispatchers, the traffic is transferred 
from a TBS to a DXT and from the DXT the traffic is sent through a multiplexer to 
the DWSs. DXTs will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.5. 
The Dispatcher Work Station (DWS), used by dispatchers, is a Personal Computer 
(PC) running a specialized Operating System (OS) and software. The DWS has a 
headset and microphone which allows the dispatcher to hear communication from 
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TETRA users and speak to the TETRA users. The DWS will be further discussed 
in Section 2.5.  
The devices in the TETRA network communicate with each other to allow TETRA 
users to communicate with each other, which will be discussed in the following 
subsection. 
 
2.4.2. TETRA Communication Overview 
Communication is the core objective of any radio technology; therefore, it is an 
essential aspect to discuss. TETRA offers new innovative features for 
communication, which can be utilized by TETRA terminals and TETRA users. 
A TETRA user can press the Push-To-Talk (PTT) button on a TETRA terminal to 
send uplink communication traffic to the TBS. As mentioned in the previous 
subsection, the intended recipient receives the downlink communication traffic, 
which, for example, could be a voice call or digital message. The communication 
can be sent to a single TETRA user, dispatcher or to groups of TETRA users. The 
groups could be allocated by dispatchers and administrators.  
Various forms of voice call communications exist in the TETRA network. The call 
types include: 
 off-hook type; 
This is where a TETRA terminal receives a ringing signal from the terminal 
of the user who is initiating a voice call. This is referred to as a telephony 
type call as the communication is directed to a single TETRA user, who 
can choose to ignore the call attempt or answer it in a similar fashion to a 
telephone call. 
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 direct express type; 
This allows a voice call to instantly be received by a user‟s receiving 
terminal. The direct express type call is similar to the off-hook type as it is 
also directed to a single TETRA user, but does not send a ringing signal to 
the receiver, as the voice communication is instantly heard by the user. 
 group type; 
This communication type allows a single TETRA user to communicate 
with all group members, but allows only one TETRA user to send voice 
traffic at a time. A priority scheme is used in the group type 
communication to allow every TETRA user in the group fair chance to 
communicate. 
 emergency type; 
This communication type allows a TETRA user to press the emergency 
button on the TETRA terminal to instantly alert an available dispatcher. 
The emergency type is usually initiated during a distress situation. 
 and, direct mode type. 
This is used when TETRA terminals are out of range of the TETRA 
network and are within range of each other and adjusted by the TETRA 
users to operate in Direct Mode Operation (DMO). DMO will be further 
discussed in Subsection 2.5.5. 
The setup of communication calls is considered fast, as a typical call to a TETRA 
user group takes less than 300 milliseconds. Some of the reasons why TETRA 
has a fast call setup time are due to the efficient call set-up procedure, framing 
format and reasonably low utilization of the control channel. TETRA also utilizes a 
speech codec known as Algebraic Code-Excited Linear Predictive (ACELP), which 
has a low output bit rate of 4.567 kb per second, which provides a good speech 
quality considering the low output bit rate. 
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Apart from voice communication, digital messages can also be used by TETRA 
users to communicate with each other. TETRA users will typically use status 
messages and Short Data Service (SDS) messages. Status messages can be 
sent to a single TETRA user or to TETRA user groups. A status message could, 
for example, indicate to a TETRA user or TETRA user group that the sender 
requests a “Callback Request” or an “Urgent Request”. The SDS messages allow 
the TETRA users to write customizable text and send it to other TETRA users or 
TETRA user groups. The written text is created by the sending TETRA user. In 
addition, digital messages are also used during the registration of TETRA 
terminals to the TETRA network. The TETRA terminals automatically send digital 
messages to the TBSs to initiate the terminal registration process. This will be 
discussed further in Section 2.7. 
The TETRA standard, discussed in Section 2.3, and network and communication 
aspects discussed in this section will be further detailed in the following sections of this 
chapter.  
The following section will elaborate on the four core TETRA devices, mentioned 
previously in this section, necessary for communication in the TETRA network. 
 
2.5. Terrestrial Trunked Radio Devices 
The previous section introduced the four core devices of a TETRA network, namely 
TETRA terminal, TBS, DXT, and DWS. This section will discuss these four core devices 
in more detail. The TETRA terminal will be discussed in Subsection 2.5.1, while the 
TBS, DXT, and DWS will be discussed in Subsection 2.5.2. 
 
2.5.1. TETRA Terminals 
As mentioned in Section 2.4, a TETRA terminal is used by TETRA users to 
communicate with the TETRA network. TETRA terminals are divided into three 
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categories, namely: handheld, mobile and data. Each category is used for a 
different purpose, but can all coexist in a TETRA network.  
The TETRA terminals are all capable of communicating in different frequency 
bands, as intended for use according to a country‟s regulatory instructions. TETRA 
terminals are available from various vendors and provide multi-vendor 
interoperability. Various specifications exist between these terminal categories and 
various vendors, such as different types of batteries, Global Positioning Service 
(GPS) functionality, durability features and size/weight differentiation (EADS 
Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 51-58). 
The following subsections will discuss the three terminal types in further detail. 
 
2.5.1.1. Handheld Terminals 
Handheld TETRA terminals are carried by TETRA users. The terminal is 
intended to be carried around while, for example, a police officer is patrolling 
in an area. General examples of terminals from EADS include the THR880i, 
the Light version of THR880i and the Ex version of the THR880i. 
The THR880i includes support for various frequency bands, such as 
380MHz–400MHz, 410MHz–430MHz, 450MHz–470MHz, 806MHz–825MHz 
and 851MHz–870MHz. The variation of the frequency bands allows users to 
conform to a country‟s regulatory requirements, meaning the THR880i can be 
used in various countries. The THR880i weighs 247 grams and is water and 
dust resistant. The terminal also includes GPS functionality (EADS Defence 
& Security, 2008b, p. 53). 
The Light version of the THR880i is identical in size and appearance, but is 
intended for users who do not require all the features provided by the 
THR880i. The Light version is scaled down to limited frequency bands, 
limited number of talk groups and does not support GPS (EADS Defence & 
Security, 2008b, p. 54). 
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The Ex version of the THR880i is more robust and intrinsically safe. 
Intrinsically safe is a definition for a device and its electrical equipment, when 
it is deemed trustworthy and safe for operation within an explosive 
environment (Schmitt, 2010). Figure 2.4 shows the THR880i terminal. 
 
Figure 2.4: Handheld THR880i (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 52) 
Even though handheld TETRA terminals share much of the same 
functionality as mobile and data terminals, handheld TETRA terminals have 
added functionality, such as Web browsing and cameras. 
 
2.5.1.2. Mobile Terminals 
Mobile TETRA terminals are installed into vehicles, such as emergency 
medical vehicles, police vehicles, fire brigade vehicles or transportation 
vehicles. Similar to handheld TETRA terminals, the mobile TETRA terminals 
also differ in specifications from manufacturer to manufacturer. The 
difference between handheld and mobile terminal specifications includes: 
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 Multiple Audio Devices; 
The mobile TETRA terminal can allow audio output to different audio 
devices, such as the built in speakers of the mobile TETRA terminal or 
other auxiliary audio devices. The mobile TETRA terminal can also use 
the audio equipment built into the vehicle, such as the speakers. 
 Ignition Sense; 
The mobile TETRA terminal can sense when the ignition of the vehicle is 
switched on. This could trigger a function to increase the brightness of the 
display, or request the TETRA user pin to be entered before the mobile 
TETRA terminal becomes available for use. 
 and, External Push-To-Talk (PTT). 
The Push-To-Talk button of a mobile TETRA terminal is generally on the 
handheld extension of the mobile TETRA terminal, which allows audio to 
be sent and received.  
These specifications are limited to TETRA devices installed in vehicles. 
Examples from EADS indicate two versions for mobile TETRA terminals, 
namely TMR880i and TMR880. Figure 2.5 shows the TMR880 Mobile 
terminal. 
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Figure 2.5: Mobile TMR880 (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 57) 
The mobile TETRA terminals are mounted inside the vehicle for comfortable 
and easy access during vehicle transit. The mobile TETRA terminals do not 
support as many frequency bands as the handheld TETRA terminals. The 
weight of the TMR880i is 1004 grams for the radio unit and 240 grams for the 
control unit. Unlike the TMR880, the TMR880i includes GPS functionality, 
smartcard-based End to End Encryption and Java 2.0 platform support 
(EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 55-56). 
The following subsection will discuss the data terminals and their intended 
use. 
 
2.5.1.3. Data Terminals 
In addition to voice communication, TETRA also caters for data-only 
communication, for example, through the TDR880i. The terminal is 
considered an advanced device and is intended for location-determination, 
remote control, monitoring and data transfer applications. The Data TDR880i 
terminal operates on the 380MHz–400MHz frequency band, weighs 230 
grams and requires an external power supply to operate. If the TDR880i 
terminal is out of range of TETRA network coverage, it has a GPS-storing 
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feature that automatically activates, which allows information to be stored 
until network reception has been re-established (EADS Defence & Security, 
2008a, pp. 41-48; EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 57). The Data 
TDR880i terminal is shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6: Data TDR880i (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 58) 
As mentioned previously, the data TETRA terminals are used for applications 
involving location-determination, remote control, monitoring and data 
transfers. The TDR880i is typically mounted in a vehicle to provide constant 
tracking of that vehicle without the requirement of communication in a courier 
van, for example.  
The examples of handheld, mobile and data terminals discussed in this subsection 
are shown in Table 2.1.   
Handheld Mobile Data 
THR880i TMR880i TDR880i 
THR880i Light TMR880  
THR880i Ex   
Table 2.1: TETRA Terminals (adapted from EADS Defence & Security (2008b, pp. 51-58)) 
Table 2.1 is a summary of the terminal types that have been discussed, which are 
all specific to EADS, due to the use of EADS TETRA standard documentation. The 
three types of TETRA terminals all interact with the TETRA network and other 
terminals. The following subsection will investigate the devices of a TETRA 
network and discuss the inter-operation of the various devices. 
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2.5.2. Network Devices 
The TETRA network is designed to be reliable and fast, and consists of various 
users and devices that allow the communication to flow in the designated manner. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, the TETRA network utilizes the following core 
devices: 
 Digital Exchange (DXT); 
The core of the TETRA network consists of a Digital Exchange for TETRA 
(DXT), which can be either a Digital Exchange for TETRA for IP series (DXTip) 
or a Digital Exchange for TETRA Transit type for IP series (DXTTip). The 
function of both the DXTip and the DXTTip is to switch voice and data on the 
TETRA network. The difference between the DXTip and DXTTip is that the 
DXTTip is a two-cabinet transit exchange used to connect to other DXTs, such 
as a DXTip or DXTTip. The DXTip connects to a TETRA Base Station (TBS), 
which then provides radio coverage for the TETRA terminal users within range. 
The DXTTip can handle higher capacity traffic and does not connect to a TBS, 
which is needed for user communication, such as a regular DXTip (EADS 
Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 19). 
 TETRA Base Station (TBS); 
TETRA Base Stations (TBS) are the devices that provide radio coverage for 
the TETRA terminals, which allow the users to communicate while within the 
coverage area. The TBS is connected to a DXT, as mentioned previously. The 
TBS could operate in different frequency bands which are adjustable for 
country regulations. The TETRA terminals will automatically use the frequency 
band selected for the TBS. The TBS can allow simultaneous traffic channels, 
with one mandatory control channel, which is utilized for simultaneous 
communication for the TETRA terminals using the same TBS. The TBS traffic 
channels are based on the amount of carriers installed in the TBS, whereby, a 
single carrier allows up to four traffic channels. Traditionally, only four carriers 
are permitted per cabinet in a TBS. However, the third generation TBS allows 
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for one or two cabinets per TBS, meaning up to 31 simultaneous traffic 
channels and one mandatory control channel. The TBSs are positioned to 
provide coverage in the geographic areas for TETRA terminal users (EADS 
Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 20-21). 
 and, Dispatcher Work Station. 
Apart from TBSs and DXTs, dispatchers also form a critical aspect for daily 
communication within a TETRA network. Dispatchers are TETRA users who 
control the flow of communication, respond to emergencies and connect 
different users for private communication. The dispatchers are required to 
utilize a device known as a Dispatcher Work Station (DWS), which allows a 
dispatcher to control the flow of the communication and respond to 
emergencies. The EADS TETRA Release 5.5 documentation discusses the 
DWS products relevant to EADS, which provide the core TETRA DWS features 
and some extra added features for the EADS DWSs. The DWS is typically 
connected to the switching infrastructure through means of a multiplexer, which 
utilizes an E1 connection to the DXT.  
A variety of DWSs are available from EADS, such as the following products: 
DWSi, DWSr, DWSx, and DWSip. The DWSs are intended for different 
scenarios, through the use of software supported by the product, also known 
as DWS Applications. The DWSi is intended for small office or single 
dispatcher in an office scenario, while the DWSr is aimed at a more dynamic or 
mobile TETRA user such as a command vehicle. The DWSx is a slightly larger 
scale of a DWSi, which is intended for several dispatchers to work together to 
manage a fleet. The DWSip supports DWS management functions over a 
TCP/IP connection, making it particularly useful for managing dispatchers from 
a centralized location. The DWS‟s have a Microsoft Windows graphical user 
interface for ease of use (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 22-24). 
The four DWS products also differ in terms of connectivity to the TETRA network.  
The DWSi uses E1 or ISDN with an EPCO device for voice, data and signalling. 
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The DWSx uses E1 through a multiplexer for voice, data and signalling; while the 
DWSr and DWSip uses IP for data and signalling in the TETRA network. To utilize 
voice through the DWSr, an E1 and multiplexer will be required to switch voice 
(EADS Defence & Security, 2009a, pp. 6-7).   
The DWS Applications, which are used on the DWSs, include the following: 
 DWS Communication; 
The DWS Communication application is the main focus for dispatchers as it 
provides an interface with the TETRA network. The application allows 
dispatchers to receive and make calls, including callback requests, within the 
network, as well as from a traditional Private Automatic Branch 
Exchange/Public Switched Telephone Network (PABX/PSTN). The DWS 
Communication application also allows the dispatcher to communicate with one 
or several groups and emergency TETRA services for users in distress. The 
application has integrated visible tracking of users on the graphical user 
interface and allows the dispatcher to have access to various call groups 
(EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 23). 
 DWS Management; 
The DWS Management application provides typical administrators with control 
over dispatchers who are using the DWS Communication, users, groups, and 
organizations. Administrators can create or customize groups, manage 
organizations and the groups within those organizations. The DWS 
Management application also allows parameters to be altered for terminals 
which are plugged in, security parameters and DWS‟s (EADS Defence & 
Security, 2008b, p. 23). 
 and, DWS Communication & Management. 
The DWS Communication & Management application combines the functions 
of the DWS Communication and DWS Management applications. The DWS 
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Communication & Management application is typically used in a small TETRA 
network, where a single DWS is required. 
Apart from TETRA users, who are using TETRA terminals, the core devices are 
needed to allow communication traffic to flow through the TETRA network. The 
TBS provides coverage for the TETRA terminal users, the DXT allows speech and 
data to be switched to the correct destination, and the dispatcher supports the 
TETRA users by using a DWS. The following subsection will investigate the 
scalability of a TETRA network, and discuss a TETRA network topology with an 
illustration. 
 
2.5.3. Network Architecture 
TETRA features a high user-base capacity, availability and fast call set-up speed. 
The devices discussed in the previous sections form the core of a TETRA network. 
The TETRA network setup, or architecture, allows for scalability to meet the 
demands of the high user-base. Scalability features of the TETRA network include: 
 TETRA exchanges (DXT); 
DXTs are centralized and allow for multiple DXTs to be added when required. 
The number of required DXTs is based on the number of TETRA users in the 
area or enhancement of coverage through the use of TBSs. DXTs allow for up 
to 256 carriers and 128 TBS‟s per exchange. To provide for additional 
scalability, a DXT can be added to an existing TETRA network if the TETRA 
user-base and TBSs have exceeded the capacity of the existing TETRA 
network.  
 TETRA Base Stations (TBS);  
The number of TBS units can be easily increased if required when more users 
and coverage are required in an area. The carriers required in a specific TBS 
are determined by the traffic-handling capacity required in the area. A single 
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TBS, as previously mentioned, can provide a maximum of 31 traffic channels 
and the coverage area provided by a single TBS can overlap with the coverage 
area of another TBS. The TETRA terminals can then choose the optimal TBS 
for service at any given moment. A TBS can be added to the existing TETRA 
network when the current TETRA terminal users have exceeded the capacity of 
the existing TETRA network. 
 and, TETRA Dispatcher Work Stations (DWS).  
The DWS units may range from a single DWS to hundreds. The requirement is 
based on the size and maintenance requirements of the TETRA network 
(EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 13). When additional dispatchers are 
required to handle the existing TETRA terminal users and network, more DWS 
devices can be installed in the call centre for the dispatchers. 
Apart from the physical scalability, the TETRA network allows for multiple users 
from various organizations to coexist in the same physical TETRA network with 
each on their own private organization, as discussed in Section 2.4.  Figure 2.7 
illustrates an example of a typical TETRA network topology that utilizes a single 
exchange with multiple TBSs for various TETRA user organizations. 
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Figure 2.7: Multi-Organizational TETRA Network Topology (adapted from EADS Defence & 
Security (2008b)) 
Figure 2.7 consists of the previously mentioned devices along with the three 
different user types: mobile TETRA users, handheld TETRA users and data 
TETRA users. The police officer holding a terminal represents the handheld 
TETRA users, while the motor vehicles represent the mobile TETRA users. The 
motorcycles represent the data TETRA users. The different TETRA users, as seen 
in Figure 2.7, can coexist and communicate with their different types of TETRA 
terminals in the same organization and geographic area. Figure 2.7 illustrates a 
typical scenario where two organizations, Organization A and Organization B, are 
using the same physical TETRA network, each with their own dispatcher(s). The 
dispatchers are typically connected to the DXTip through a multiplexer to allow 
multiple DWS‟s to be connected to one port on the exchange. The DXTip connects 
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to the TBS‟s and DWS‟s through E1 transmission connections, while the TBSs 
connect to the TETRA terminals through radio frequencies (EADS Defence & 
Security, 2008b, pp. 14-16).  
The users of the terminals can communicate with other users in the same 
organization, including the dispatchers. The dispatchers can connect to other 
dispatchers from another organization if needed. A simple example is a mobile 
terminal from Organization B, such as a patrolling police vehicle, can request 
communication to an emergency medical unit of Organization A via a dispatcher. 
The dispatchers can connect the two calls together and allow them to 
communicate easily (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 18-19).  
The TETRA network size of Figure 2.7 could potentially scale to provide country-
wide coverage and integrate it with surrounding countries, as is being done in 
Europe. 
The TETRA network highlights the integration of various discussed devices, to provide a 
network solution that has embedded security, technical features and extremely fast call-
setup time. The following section will continue discussing the operation of a TETRA 
network, while investigating the various operation modes. 
 
2.6. Basic Operation 
The TETRA network allows many TETRA users to be classified into talk groups, 
allowing the users to talk to other TETRA users in that group. Using the example in 
Figure 2.7 in Subsection 2.5.3, Organization A could have two groups within the 
organization such as “Group Handheld” and “Group Data”. Depending on the 
configuration, these two groups within Organization A can communicate independently 
either within the group or with other groups in the same organization. Furthermore, 
Organization B could have different talk groups for the different precincts to be used by 
patrolling police officers. Each user can belong to a single group in the organization or 
to multiple groups. The user of the terminal can choose which group they want to 
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communicate in and can adjust the terminal to allow listening from all groups to which 
they have been added by the dispatcher. 
The TETRA network allows for emergency communication to be initiated by TETRA 
terminal users, which is normally received by a dispatcher. The nature of the emergency 
call can be adjusted to allow two-way communication or one-way communication, where 
the dispatcher can only hear the TETRA user in distress. This option of a two-way or 
one-way TETRA emergency call depends on the terminal, manufacturer and the 
parameters configured by the administrator (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 35-
36).  
The operation of a TETRA communication call can be done in different modes, which 
will be discussed in the following subsection. The following subsections will also provide 
a summary of the benefits for using TETRA as a communication solution. 
  
2.6.1. User Operation Modes 
The TETRA network allows the TETRA users to specify which user operation 
mode they want to use. The operation mode could depend on the location or 
nature of the communication of the user. The TETRA network supports two user 
operation modes, namely; Trunk Mode Operation (TMO) and Direct Mode 
Operation (DMO) (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, pp. 99-101; EADS Defence 
& Security, 2009b, pp. 152-153).  
 Trunk Mode Operation (TMO) 
The default TETRA operation mode is TMO. The operation depends on 
the radio activity of a functioning TBS to allow TETRA terminals to 
communicate and use the features of the TETRA network. Most of the 
TETRA terminal features require communication with a TBS to function, 
such as the emergency services or GPS feature. A typical TMO call to 
another user or group will initiate from the sending user‟s TETRA terminal 
to a TBS and then from the TBS to the intended recipient user‟s TETRA 
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terminal (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, pp. 99-101). Figure 2.8 is an 
example of a typical user to user call using TMO. 
 
Figure 2.8: Trunk Mode Operation 
Figure 2.8 displays the integral role of a TBS in TMO user mode. As 
previously mentioned, TMO is the default user operation mode, while 
DMO is considered the fail-safe mode. Many of the TETRA network and 
terminal features require the TETRA terminals to be in TMO user 
operation mode. 
 Direct Mode Operation (DMO) 
A TETRA user could be out of range of a TBS, resulting in no network 
coverage for regular essential communication. The user might still be in 
range of another user, who might be inside the network coverage. The 
TETRA user outside the TETRA network coverage area can easily adjust 
the TETRA terminal by pressing the DMO button to scan for other TETRA 
users in range for a DMO communication call (EADS Defence & Security, 
2008b, pp. 47-48). 
In addition to this, a TETRA user may prefer a direct private 
communication call with another TETRA user in the organization. When 
the terminal is adjusted to DMO, the communication flows between the 
two users and not the rest of the network which results in a purely private 
conversation, but with potentially less security. The regular communication 
radio path is altered while in DMO. Figure 2.9 illustrates the radio path of a 
user to user call with DMO. 
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Figure 2.9: Direct Mode Operation 
As can be seen in Figure 2.9; the handheld TETRA terminal user 
communicates directly with another user, without the intervention of a 
TBS. It is important to remember that the DMO user mode is considered 
more of a fail-safe function, as most of the features of the TETRA network 
will not be available to the TETRA user. Preferably, TETRA users should 
use the terminals in Trunk Mode Operation (TMO. 
As seen, the option exists for a TETRA user to adjust the operation mode of a 
terminal to ensure continued communication in the case where TETRA coverage 
is not available. Utilizing a TETRA network and all of the provided features allows 
organizations to enjoy various benefits. The following subsection will evaluate the 
benefits of a typical TETRA network. 
 
2.6.2. Benefits of TETRA Network Operation 
The interoperation of a TETRA network allows TETRA handheld, mobile and data 
terminals to communicate with each other. The TETRA terminals also 
communicate with the TETRA network devices, which can be monitored by 
dispatchers. Fully utilizing the TETRA network provides many benefits to various 
sectors.  The benefits of an integrated TETRA network operation will be discussed 
in this subsection. 
A TETRA network utilizes 25 kHz for a carrier and allows four channels in that 
carrier frequency. This means that only 6.25 kHz bandwidth per channel is 
required for communications. This can be compared to the 25 kHz bandwidth per 
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channel of GSM networks, indicating TETRA uses less frequency to provide equal 
or even superior quality to GSM. The reason for such a low frequency is due to the 
codecs (coders and decoders) used by TETRA. Given the same frequency space, 
such as 380MHz–400MHz, the TETRA network allows for more communication 
channels than a GSM network (Stavroulakis, 2007, pp. 52-53). 
The TETRA network allows the TETRA users to choose which operation mode is 
most fitting for the TETRA user at a given point in time. Users can communicate in 
groups, emergencies or directly with another user while the TETRA network 
provides a priority scheme for the communications. As mentioned in Section 2.4, 
the calls of a TETRA network are set up extremely fast, compared to other radio 
communication technologies.  
The TETRA network allows TETRA data to simultaneously traverse a TETRA 
network while TETRA voice communications are in progress. This includes digital 
messages or even Web browsing traffic, if the Web features are available on a 
TETRA terminal and enabled by the organization‟s administrator. 
The interoperability of the TETRA standard allows various manufacturers to design 
and implement terminals and devices for a TETRA network. The interoperability of 
a multi-vendor environment allows communication between various 
manufacturers, such as a Motorola TETRA terminal and an EADS TETRA 
terminal. This impacts the organizations, as they can decide which manufacturer to 
support depending on budget limitations. This also allows scalability, as more 
expensive terminals could be specifically purchased for a specific group in the 
organization for added features. 
Table 2.2 provides a brief overview of the benefits discussed in this subsection. 
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Benefits Information 
Channel Efficiency 
Four channels per carrier for increased 
throughput 
Emergency and Safety 
Features 
Group communication, Emergency calls, 
Priority scheme, Direct Mode Operation, 
Reliable performance and fast call set-up 
Advanced Data 
Communication 
Provides data transfer services that allow 
voice and data to traverse simultaneously 
Security 
Encryption of voice, data and signalling, 
end-to-end encryption and authentication 
to access the network 
Multi-Vendor Environment 
Various vendors support the standard and 
allow interoperability amongst different 
vendors 
Table 2.2: Benefits of TETRA (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 11-12) 
These benefits, however, can only be enjoyed if the network is secure and properly 
utilized. It is important to realize the requirement of security in TETRA networks due to 
the importance of communication for PSS organizations using TETRA. Security should 
be a core aspect for TETRA network designs and solutions. The security features 
include encryption, authentication and various other security settings. The security 
features can be controlled by users, dispatchers and administrators. TETRA security will 
be discussed in the following section. 
 
2.7. Terrestrial Trunked Radio Security 
The TETRA network includes many security features to ensure critical information and 
that the TETRA users are protected. Management of TETRA security is also a key 
feature in the TETRA network to ensure control is available for users, dispatchers, and 
administrators. TETRA security features, such as authentication and encryption, will be 
discussed in the following subsections. 
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2.7.1. Authentication 
TETRA authentication ensures that only valid devices are allowed to operate in the 
TETRA network. The authentication of a TETRA device is initiated at the 
registration of a TETRA device by an administrator and is then continuously 
authenticated as it is used in the TETRA network, depending on the security policy 
and parameters set up by the administrator. The Digital Exchange for TETRA 
(DXT) authenticates the TETRA device, such as a handheld TETRA terminal, 
before it is allowed to communicate in the TETRA network. Mutual authentication 
means the radio device is also able to authenticate the DXT which prohibits 
unauthorized exchanges in the TETRA network. Mutual authentication is only 
supported by certain TETRA terminals and is an optional security feature, while 
authentication from the TETRA terminal to the DXT is a necessity. The 
authentication process is based on a secret key that is only known by the TETRA 
terminal and the DXT. The DXT challenges the TETRA terminal for the correct 
secret key before the TETRA terminal is allowed authentication. 
Apart from the DXT and TETRA terminals, the TETRA Dispatcher Work Stations 
(DWSs) require that dispatchers log on with usernames and passwords which are 
stored in a database on the exchange network (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, 
p. 42). TETRA also provides access control for the DWS‟s of the dispatchers by 
means of Smart Cards and pin codes. The dispatcher will have to insert the Smart 
Card into the Smart Card Reader and insert the pin code to unlock the DWS 
application on the DWS. The regular authentication of username and password will 
be prompted if the Smart Card Reader is successfully unlocked with the correct 
Smart Card and pin code (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, p. 186). 
 
2.7.2. Encryption 
TETRA encryption ensures that traffic in the TETRA network is in an encrypted 
format to increase the security of the communication. Two variations are supported 
by TETRA, namely; Air Interface Encryption (AIE) and End-to-End Encryption 
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(E2EE). AIE aims to encrypt all the communication transferred on the radio path, 
from the TETRA Base Station (TBS) to the terminals and vice versa, which 
includes voice, data messages and signalling traffic. E2EE encrypts traffic beyond 
the TETRA terminals and TBSs. E2EE ensures traffic from TBSs to DXTs and 
DWSs are also encrypted (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 43-44).  
The encryption utilizes Cipher keys to encrypt the traffic in various ways. There is 
a total of three different types of Cipher Keys which are used in TETRA, namely; 
Derived Cipher Key (DCK), Common Cipher Key (CCK), and Static Cipher Key 
(SCK).  
DCK is typically generated during the authentication of TETRA terminals to the 
TBS. DCK is used during encryption of individual point-to-point calls and 
encryption of the uplink during a group call. CCK is specific to geographic areas 
and TETRA terminals are updated with new CCKs through an encrypted digital 
message from the TBS when the TETRA terminal moves to a new geographic 
area. The encrypted messages are only sent after registration and authentication 
is complete. CCK is also used to encrypt the downlink during a group call. SCK is 
used as a basic form of encryption, which will typically be used during Direct Mode 
Operation (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, p. 184).  
 
2.7.3. Jamming Detection 
Jamming Detection is a feature that warns the administrators of accidental or 
malicious jamming of signals within the TETRA network. The detection alarm is 
signalled when uplink-traffic is detected on the TETRA network and does not 
contain proper TETRA modulation. The alarm is cancelled when regular TETRA 
modulation is restored in the affected area. The administrator can decide on 
appropriate action when the alarm is received (EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, 
p. 44). 
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2.7.4. Ambience Listening 
Ambience Listening is a security feature where a dispatcher can listen to a TETRA 
terminal that is not engaged in communication. This feature contains various 
adjustable modes which can be used in different situations. One such mode allows 
a terminal user to initiate an emergency call to a dispatcher without allowing the 
dispatcher to communicate back. Ambience Listening can also be done from the 
dispatcher side without the TETRA user knowing the terminal is being used for 
one-way communication. Dispatchers could use Ambience Listening in a potential 
hostage situations or when terminals have been stolen or misplaced (EADS 
Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 44-45). 
 
2.7.5. Enabling/Disabling Terminals 
A TETRA terminal can be enabled or disabled to prevent it from accessing 
services on the TETRA network. In the event that a TETRA terminal is lost or 
stolen, the administrator or dispatcher can disable a TETRA terminal from the 
TETRA network. This prevents the TETRA terminal from possibly accessing 
unauthorized information. If the TETRA terminal is recovered, the administrator or 
dispatcher can enable the terminal for usage on the TETRA network (EADS 
Defence & Security, 2008b, p. 45). 
 
2.7.6. Hidden Organization 
The default set up of DWS‟s allows the dispatchers to see details about the 
organizations utilizing the TETRA network. Not all dispatchers, however, should be 
allowed to access information about all the TETRA organizations. Therefore, the 
Hidden Organization feature allows the owning organization to adjust the visibility 
of the organization to selected dispatchers. This provides only employees of the 
organization with visibility within the organization and privileges to the 
organization‟s configurations (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, p. 192). 
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2.7.7. Archive Recording 
Archive Recording allows for individual or group traffic to be recorded. The 
selected individual traffic for recording includes; individual calls, individually 
addressed status messages, individually addressed Short Data Service (SDS) 
messages, and related information such as caller identities. The selected group 
traffic for recording includes; group calls, group addressed status messages, and 
group addressed SDS messages. The data is stored on a computer on the TETRA 
network with the recording application installed (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, 
pp. 193-195). 
 
2.7.8. Logging 
Logging allows administrators and dispatchers to track changes made to the 
TETRA network. Logging includes the tracking of management events and 
operational events. Logging of management events is typically stored on an Audit 
Trail Server, which includes the following events; logging on/off, subscriber events, 
organization events, authentication keys, group events, group selection events, 
group membership events, and location tracking events. Logging of operational 
events is typically stored locally on DWS, which include the following events; call 
events, status/SDS message events, data management events, and location 
tracking events (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, pp. 196-197). 
 
2.7.9. TBS Fallback 
TETRA provides TBS Fallback communication in the event of a TBS losing 
connection to the DXT. The TBS may still be functional, but there is no access 
from the TBS into the TETRA network for proper Trunked Mode Operation. During 
the TBS Fallback mode, the TBS is isolated from the rest of the TETRA network 
which results in no calls to or from the DXT, which could include dispatchers. The 
terminals are alerted that the TBS is in fallback mode and any new registrations 
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will be temporarily accepted. When the fallback is lifted and communication is 
restored to the DXT, the new terminal registrations will be queried for 
authentication.  
TBS Fallback has two operational modes, namely: TBS Fixed Fallback and TBS 
Enhanced Fallback. The former only allows three predefined groups for users to 
communicate in during fallback, while the latter allows any group call in the TBS to 
continue. The TBS Enhanced Fallback also allows data messages to continue in 
the TBS between the users. TBS Fixed Fallback is the predecessor of TBS 
Enhanced Fallback, which is only available from release version 5.5 and later 
(EADS Defence & Security, 2008b, pp. 45-46). 
The previous subsections discussed the security features of a TETRA network in detail. 
The following table provides a brief overview of the security aspects. 
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Security Summary 
Authentication Tests if terminals and devices are 
authenticated, using passwords etc. 
Encryption Encrypts traffic flowing from terminals to 
DXTs and vice versa, using Cipher Keys. 
Ambience Listening Enables remote listening or two-way 
conversations during critical situations. 
Terminal Enable/Disable Enable or disable terminals who are 
attempting to access TETRA services. 
Hidden Organizations Hide organizations from DWSs so that 
only selected DWSs can access them. 
Archive Recording Record traffic from a user, including calls, 
messages, and related data. 
Logging Logging management events to an Audit 
Trail Server or locally to a DWS. 
TBS Fallback Allow users to communicate when a TBS 
loses connection with DXTs. 
TBS Jamming Detection Allows TBSs to detect jamming signals 
and alert administrators. 
Table 2.3: TETRA Security Summary 
The security features discussed in this section form part of the core nine security 
features discussed in the NMMU course material for EADS End User System Course 
(EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, p. 177). The security features are not limited to the 
nine mentioned in this section, as manufacturing vendors can add proprietary security 
features as well. However, for the purposes of this research the EADS documentation 
was investigated, as the EADS documentation is the focus for the course material at the 
NMMU. 
A TETRA network could potentially include many security and safety features, with 
some mandatory for regular operation and others optional. With security features 
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enabled, TETRA is considered to be one of the most secure forms of radio 
communication available. 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
The TETRA standard for radio communication is used throughout the world, primarily in 
Public Safety and Security (PSS) sectors, to provide a fast and secure form of 
communication. The TETRA users in the PSS sectors require the radio communication 
to be fast and efficient, as it could mean the difference between life and death. The 
TETRA users in PSS sectors also require secure communication, as inaccurate or 
malformed information could possibly result in the loss of human life. 
The TETRA standard and technology are, therefore, continuously amended and 
upgraded to ensure that the communication remains fast and secure. The security 
posture of a TETRA network is maintained to ensure communication is secure. As 
mentioned in this chapter, the security and technical features of TETRA are considered 
advanced.  However, as with all technology, humans are involved with the configuration 
and operation of the TETRA network. Arguably, whenever humans are involved, no 
system can be considered completely secure. 
Valuable information is constantly transmitted in TETRA networks. This information is 
an asset to the organization and requires protection. Therefore, the following chapter 
will investigate the importance of information security and the role it plays in an 
organization. The next chapter will elaborate on the characteristics of information and 
the threats that could compromise its integrity. 
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Chapter 3: The Human Factor of Information 
Security 
This chapter elaborates on operational security in information security environments. 
This chapter discusses the core information security characteristics, controls, attacks, 
and human behaviour.  
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 “The empires of the future are the empires of the mind” – Winston Churchill 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The empires of today, and quite possibly in the future, revolve around information. 
Information is defined as knowledge that has been derived from study, experience, or 
instruction (Farlex, 2012). Information also shares similarities to currency, as 
information has value. Information has also been identified as an asset to organizations 
and is also considered the lifeblood of organizations. The value of information depends 
on the process of creating information. 
The process of creating information involves raw data and knowledge. People 
constantly create, use and disseminate knowledge. Knowledge is the understanding of 
the relationships between data. When raw data is arranged in a meaningful manner, 
using knowledge, it becomes information (Stair & Reynolds, 2008, pp. 5-6). The value of 
the information, therefore, depends on the raw data and knowledge, which can be 
directly related to people.  
Information is typically stored on and processed by a combination of hardware, 
software, communication networks, and processes and is integrated into everyday tasks 
and activities. People constantly interact with these combinations of devices, which 
handle the information, to complete tasks. This chapter will investigate information 
security within an organizational environment which involves employees. The threats to 
the protection of information assets, including the influence that human behaviour has 
on information security will also be discussed. 
 
3.2. Information Security 
Information security is a vitally important topic with many different interpretations and 
definitions that are generally accepted (Torres, Sarriegi, Santos, & Serrando, 2006). 
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This section will provide a clear definition of information security, which will be used 
throughout the chapter. 
Information security is a discipline that is concerned with the implementation and 
support of security and control measures to protect information. Information security 
attempts to secure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information (British 
Standards Institute, 1993, p. 1). 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are identified as part of the critical 
characteristics of information (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, p. 11). The confidentiality of 
information protects the information from disclosure or exposure to unauthorized 
employees or systems and ensures that only employees with rights and privileges may 
access the information with confidential protection (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, p. 13). 
The value of confidentiality is directly related to the value of the information. The 
difference between confidentiality and privacy is that confidentiality is a required 
component of privacy and contains the ability to protect information from unauthorized 
employees (Andress, 2011, p. 4). 
Integrity of information ensures that the information remains whole, complete and 
uncorrupted or is the ability to prevent data from being changed in an unauthorized 
manner (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, pp. 13-14; Andress, 2011, p. 5). Corruption of 
information can occur while information is stored or transmitted and could be the result 
of, for example, computer viruses and worms. The integrity of information can be 
maintained through the use of hashing algorithms which verify that the stored or 
transmitted file matches the original file (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, pp. 14-15). 
Availability of information enables authorized employees to access information without 
interference or obstruction. The information should also be available in the required 
format (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, p. 12).  
The relationships between the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information that 
exist are represented as the CIA Triangle in Figure 3.2.   
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Figure 3.2: CIA Triad (adapted from Andress (2011)) 
There are various attacks on information which could affect the CIA Triad and it is likely 
that the relationship between two or more of the CIA Triad will be attacked or affected 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003, pp. 10-11). The following subsections will discuss the 
relationships between confidentiality, integrity and availability, as represented by A, B, C 
and D in Figure 3.2. 
 
3.2.1. Relationship between Confidentiality and Availability (A) 
The relationship between confidentiality and availability requires that information 
be accessible only by authorized employees, while being available for use to the 
same authorized employees when required (Stamp, 2006, p. 2). For example, 
information can be encrypted on a device, which also requires user password 
authentication, which will provide confidentiality for the information. If the device is 
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corrupted, through faulty hardware, the employee with the correct user password 
and decryption keys will not have access to the information. For the device 
containing the information to be useful to an organization, the relationship between 
confidentiality and availability should be protected.  Typically, a security attack 
intended for either the availability or confidentiality of information could result in the 
confidentiality and availability relationship being broken.  
 
3.2.2. Relationship between Confidentiality and Integrity (B) 
The relationship between confidentiality and integrity requires that information be 
accessed only by authorized employees, while information remains whole, 
complete and uncorrupted (Stamp, 2006, p. 2).  
Utilizing confidential information sometimes creates a false belief that the 
information is correct or uncorrupted. The confidentiality and integrity relationship 
can be viewed in an example of a secure database of emails. Authorized 
employees have the right to access the emails by entering the correct user 
password and optional decryption keys. The integrity of the accessed emails 
cannot be verified through decryption and authorization alone, except when some 
encryption methods include hashing algorithms. The hashing algorithms allow the 
integrity of information to be verified, resulting in verification that the information 
has remained uncorrupted and whole. Without confidentiality, the information can 
be accessed by unauthorized employees and potentially be altered, but without 
integrity, authorized employees cannot trust that the information is whole, 
complete or uncorrupted. The relationship of confidentiality and integrity is required 
for information to be kept secure (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003, p. 24). 
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3.2.3. Relationship between Availability and Integrity (C) 
The relationship between availability and integrity requires that information be 
accessible to authorized employees when required, while the information remains 
whole, complete and uncorrupted (Stamp, 2006, p. 2).  
It is important that information be available within an organization to be useful for 
tasks. Adding the value of having correct information available creates an even 
more important requirement for usage within an organization for tasks. When 
information is not available, the whole, complete or uncorrupted state of 
information is of little to no concern. When the information is available, the whole, 
complete or uncorrupted state is important to successfully utilize information. If 
information is unavailable in the required format to employees, it might still be 
available through other mediums, and open to digital attacks. This indicates that 
verification of information is extremely important if information was unavailable for 
a period, due to the possibility that files could have been corrupted during the 
unavailable period.  
 
3.2.4. Relationship between Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity (D) 
The relationship between the three characteristics of the CIA Triad requires that 
information be accessible to authorized employees, while being available for use 
by authorized employees and the information remains whole, complete and 
uncorrupted.  Information assets that are identified as being critical to the 
organization will, most likely, have a relationship between confidentiality, integrity 
and availability (Calder, 2009, p. 4) 
The previously discussed sections indicate that relationships exist between the 
characteristics of confidentiality, integrity and availability and, together, form a 
complete relationship.  For example, if hard drives containing information are 
stolen from an organization, this could affect the relationship between all three 
characteristics.    
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Authorized employees cannot access the information from the stolen hard drives, 
as the hard drives are not in the possession of the organization any more, which is 
a breach of availability. The hard drives are in the possession of unauthorized 
criminals, who could possibly crack security measures on the hard drives to view 
the information, which is a breach of confidentiality. Older backup information can 
be restored within the organization, but the information may not be whole or 
complete, which is a breach of integrity (Andress, 2011, p. 6). 
In addition to describing information security relationships, the CIA Triad allows for the 
categorization of attacks into those affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Attacks on information security with relation to the CIA Triad will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
3.3. Information Security Attacks 
As seen in the previous section, confidentiality, integrity and availability are vitally 
important to ensure the protection of information.  However, these three characteristics 
are often under threat of attack.  The threats to the information assets include, but are 
not limited to, identity fraudsters, information thieves, malicious cyber criminals, and 
insiders. Identity fraudsters steal a person‟s identity and impersonate that person. 
Information thieves steal information and sell the information for money. Malicious cyber 
criminals are hackers that utilize technical means, such as computer worms and 
viruses, to reach their goals. Insiders are employees who are disgruntled or corrupt 
within an organization. These threats can generally be related to any organization, even 
the Public Safety and Security (PSS) sector. These criminals aim to disrupt one or a 
combination of confidentiality, integrity and availability (Choo, 2010). 
Considering the immense amount of attack variations, the information security attacks 
can be categorized into four distinct profiles. The profiles include: interception, 
interruption, modification and fabrication (Andress, 2011, pp. 8-9). These profiles 
threaten the security of information with relation to the CIA Triad and the attacks are not 
limited to just one aspect of information security. As discussed previously, some types 
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of attacks affect the relationships of the CIA Triad. The following subsections will 
discuss the CIA Triad and the related attacks.    
 
3.3.1. Confidentiality Information Security Attacks 
Confidentiality protects information against unauthorized individuals. The attack 
profile that affects confidentiality is interception, as shown in Figure 3.3.   
 
Figure 3.3: Confidentiality Information Security Attacks (adapted from Basics of Information 
Security (Andress, 2011, p. 8)) 
Interception attacks allow unauthorized individuals, who could use sophisticated 
interception systems, to access the organization‟s information, which is primarily 
identified as an attack on the confidentiality of an organization‟s information. 
Attackers can intercept information in various forms, such as unauthorized file 
viewing or copying, eavesdropping on conversations, or reading e-mails. When an 
interception attack is properly executed by an attacker, it is almost impossible to 
detect the security breach (Andress, 2011, p. 9). The unauthorized individual could 
own a mobile computing device with specialized software, such as BackTrack 5, 
which would allow the individual to initiate an attack where the individual is 
considered “in the middle” of a streaming information transfer process. The attack 
allows the unauthorized individual to sniff the information and intercept the traffic. 
This type of attack is also known as a “Man in the Middle” attack, which is difficult 
to detect if properly executed (Ramachandran, 2011, pp. 141-146).  
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3.3.2. Integrity Information Security Attacks 
Integrity protects information against corruption or alterations. Various attack 
profiles can be identified that threaten the integrity of information. Figure 3.4 shows 
the attack profiles identified that may affect the integrity of information. 
 
Figure 3.4: Integrity Information Security Attacks (adapted from Basics of Information Security 
(Andress, 2011, p. 8)) 
Interruption attacks result in organizational assets becoming unstable or 
unavailable on a temporary or permanent basis. A typical interruption attack could 
be a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on a mail server, which will result in an 
unusable or unavailable mailing system for the organization. The possibility of data 
being corrupted or lost is plausible in a DoS attack on an e-mail server, which can 
be seen as an attack on both integrity and availability (Andress, 2011, p. 9). 
Modification attacks tamper with information assets, which may primarily be 
considered an attack on the integrity of information due to the effected information 
no longer being whole, complete and/or uncorrupted (Andress, 2011, p. 9).  
Fabrication attacks include the generation of data, processes, communications, or 
similar activities on a system. This, of course, affects the integrity of information 
(Andress, 2011, p. 9). The following subsection will discuss how interruption, 
modification and fabrication attack profiles can also affect the availability of 
information.  
 
3.3.3. Availability Information Security Attacks 
Availability protects information against interference and ensures that the 
information is available in the required format. The attack profiles mentioned in the 
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previous subsection, also affect availability. Figure 3.5 shows the attacks profiles 
that affect availability.   
 
Figure 3.5: Availability Information Security Attack (adapted from Basics of Information Security 
(Andress, 2011, p. 8)) 
The same attack profiles discussed in the previous subsection with regard to the 
integrity of information can also be applied to the availability of information, as well 
as the relationship between integrity and availability. Interruption attacks disrupt 
regular operations and render information unstable or unavailable. Interruption 
primarily affects availability, due to the information not being available. 
Modification primarily affects the integrity of information, but if specific types of files 
are altered or specific types of processes are created, the issue could result in an 
availability breach as well. Configuration files can be modified, which is a breach of 
integrity, but could potentially result in services becoming unavailable. Consider an 
alteration of a configuration file for a mailing server, which causes the mailing 
services to become unavailable. This is a typical modification attack which affects 
both integrity and availability (Andress, 2011, p. 9). 
Fabrication of information is also primarily an integrity attack, but if specific types 
of processes, data or malicious code are created, the possibility exists that the 
availability of information is breached. For example, an e-mail is fabricated to 
contain a potentially harmful payload, such as a worm. A mailing server is infected 
with the worm; which could render the server unavailable for legitimate users. This 
is a typical fabrication attack which affects integrity and availability of information 
within an organization (Andress, 2011, p. 9).  
Figure 3.6 shows a summary of the discussed attack profiles with relation to the 
CIA Triad. 
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Figure 3.6: Categories of Attack Security (Andress, 2011, p. 8) 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the susceptibility of the CIA Triad to various identified attack 
profiles. As discussed, humans use various attacks to breach confidentiality, integrity 
and/or availability. These humans are classified as criminals, or more specifically cyber 
criminals, due to the nature of theft or destruction of information which is not the 
property of the criminal (Schell & Martin, 2004, pp. 2-3). Cyber criminals commit 
cybercrime, which is identified as “the use of the Internet, computers, and related 
technologies in the commission of a crime” (Maras, 2011, pp. 1-2). Cyber criminals 
include not only malicious hackers, but also social engineers. Social engineers will be 
discussed in Section 3.5. 
Cyber criminals threaten all aspects of information security in an organization. It is for 
protection against cyber criminals that we require information security controls to 
prevent criminals from intercepting, interrupting, modifying and fabricating the 
information of an organization. As the Internet and Information Communication 
Technologies continue to advance within organizations, the opportunities for criminal 
exploitation of online systems will increase (Choo, 2010). Security controls and 
countermeasures are required to protect information against exploitation. The following 
section will investigate the protection of information, also known as the information 
security controls. 
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3.4. Information Security Controls 
Many recommendations and guidelines exist to protect information assets against 
exploitation. The recommendations and guidelines are generally included within 
internationally accepted standards. The standards exist to aid organizations with the 
implementation and management of a successful information security strategy. Popular 
standards include the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) and the ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004). The 
controls listed in these popular information security standards attempt to reduce risks to 
information posed by vulnerabilities in the organization. The vulnerabilities could lead to 
a breach in the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of information. The controls 
are sub-divided into three categories. The three categories include physical controls, 
technical controls and operational controls (Thomson, 1998, p. 29).  
The three categories will be discussed in the following subsections to better understand 
the human factor, which will be discussed in section 3.5. 
 
3.4.1. Physical Controls 
Physical items, objects or areas can be physically protected by means of physical 
controls. The physical controls include locked security gates, guards and anything 
that has a physical presence and proactively defends items, objects or areas. 
Physical controls could prevent unauthorized access, physical theft of equipment, 
sabotage and espionage of information (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, pp. 3-8; Tipton, 
2004, p. 2). 
 
3.4.2. Technical Controls 
Information that is digitally stored could be accessed with remote access features. 
This convenient method of information transmission could cause potential security 
issues if not protected properly. Technical controls can be identified as the 
safeguards that are incorporated into computer hardware, software and firmware 
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that provide digital access control mechanisms, digital authentication and 
identification mechanisms, intrusion prevention firewalls and various other security 
features to protect information (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002, p. 20; 
Tipton, 2004, pp. 5-6).  
 
3.4.3. Operational Controls 
Operational security controls, also identified as nontechnical or management 
controls, include controls that handle the behaviour of employees through security 
policies, operational or procedural policies and the administration of other controls. 
Physical and technical controls depend, to a large degree, on operational controls. 
This dependency is required for physical and technical controls to be effective 
within an organizational environment. In turn, operational controls depend on 
human cooperation to be effective (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002, p. 20; 
van Niekerk, 2010, pp. 34-35; Tipton, 2004, p. 8). 
Physical and technical security controls alone are not adequate to protect 
information assets. It is necessary that users of information also take responsibility 
for security. Operational controls attempt to make employees responsible for their 
actions (van Niekerk, 2010, p. 34).  
An example of an operational control is the requirement that an employee must log 
off a computer and lock the office door when he/she is leaving the office. If the 
employee ignores this procedure, both the information security physical and 
technical controls have been compromised. The physical protection of the door is 
compromised along with the technical authentication protection of the computer. 
The employee that did not adhere to this operational control should be held 
responsible in the event of a breach of security, due to negligence of operational 
controls. This example indicates that relying only on physical and technical 
security, provides, at best, an illusion of the security of information (Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002, p. 4). 
  
62 The Human Factor of Information Security 
The information security controls mentioned in this section attempt to provide protection 
for the physical, technical and operational aspects of an organization. A breach of any 
of the information security controls could result in a breach of the confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, and the relationships between the CIA Triad of information. An 
important factor to consider is the degree of human involvement in the aforementioned 
controls. Human involvement is required for the implementation, maintenance, repair 
and upgrade of information security controls.  
The required human involvement could include physical controls, such as human 
involvement during the installation and usage of a security gate, which provides physical 
protection. An employee maintains the security gate by regularly checking if the security 
gate is operating correctly. The human involvement during usage can be controlled by 
setting up an operational control, such as a policy that every employee using the 
security gate must have their own key and are not allowed to leave the gate unlocked or 
even allow known authorized employees through without them using their own key. 
Human involvement in both physical and technical controls means that it is possible for 
these controls to be exploited. The following section will discuss human behaviour and 
the role it plays in the exploitation of information security controls. 
 
3.5. Human Behaviour 
Human involvement plays an important role in information security, as employees are 
required during implementation, maintenance, repair, and upgrade of information 
security controls. The employees have to interact with security controls, for example, 
security locks on rooms require an employee to purchase the lock and keys. The 
employee fits the lock, maintains the lock by checking up on it regularly, replaces or 
repairs it if the lock is not functioning properly, and upgrades the security lock when 
deemed necessary.  
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Human involvement creates an opportunity for information security control exploitations, 
such as human manipulation attacks. The factors that increase the success of 
manipulation will be discussed in the following subsections. 
 
3.5.1. Human Behavioural Factor 
Information security controls, mentioned in Section 3.4, exist together in an 
organization to provide a cohesive layer of security to information assets. Physical 
controls, together with technical controls, could provide protection for information 
assets. However, without operational controls, it could merely be an illusion of 
security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 4). As mentioned in the previous section, 
information security requires users of an organization to take responsibility for their 
actions. It is important to realize that human involvement is critical in the security of 
information assets. Therefore, as most information security controls rely on the 
actions and behaviour of employees, it follows that this behaviour must be 
managed. Policies, procedures and other operational controls are placed within 
the organization to manage the behaviour of employees and users, which 
ultimately enhances or enforces the proper physical and technical security controls 
(van Niekerk, 2010, pp. 35-36). 
Unfortunately, many employees believe that because they are skilled at generating 
spreadsheets, word processing documents, and presentations, they are now “all-
knowing” with relation to computers (Vacca, 2009, p. 4). This creates confidence 
for the employees, who consider themselves “power users”.  However, the 
average employee in an organization is often identified as the weakest link in 
information security (Vacca, 2009, p. 4; Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 3). Most 
organizations possess information that ranges from relatively insignificant to 
extremely sensitive. These information assets must be protected.  Many 
employees will indiscriminately install applications and visit questionable websites. 
Cyber criminals, who may want to steal confidential information of the 
organization, could target these “power users” (Vacca, 2009, p. 4). Therefore, it 
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can be argued that without addressing the human factor in information security, 
organizations cannot be assured that their information assets are properly secured 
(van Niekerk, 2010, p. 36). 
The following subsection will elaborate on behavioural issues, typically attacks 
directed at manipulating employees in order to circumvent information security 
controls. 
 
3.5.2. Human Behavioural Issues in the IT Environment 
A typical organization will have physical controls, technical controls and 
operational controls, as discussed in the previous sections. However, information 
assets could still be compromised if these security measures are bypassed 
through the manipulation of employees. This is better known as „hacking the 
human‟. This type of hacking is defined as “to manipulate people, by deception, 
into giving out information, or performing an action”, which is known as social 
engineering (Mann, 2008, p. 11; DeFino, Kaufman, Valenteen, & Greenblatt, 2010, 
p. 138). 
As mentioned previously, employees handle information and should be ultimately 
responsible for the protection of information. The social engineer exploits certain 
characteristics of employees; which may include gullibility, laziness, good 
manners, or even enthusiasm. These characteristics of employees are difficult to 
defend against a socially engineered attack, because employees might not realize 
they have been tricked or manipulated, or employees might not admit this to 
security professionals (Microsoft, 2006). 
The employees are targets for social engineers, who want sensitive information 
and will spend a lot of time identifying flaws in the employees and the environment 
(DeFino, Kaufman, Valenteen, & Greenblatt, 2010, p. 138). The following 
subsections will discuss the range and types of social engineering attacks which 
are used on employees. 
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3.5.2.1. The Range of Social Engineering Attacks 
The reach of a social engineer could potentially be unlimited, as the modern 
age allows for multiple forms of communication. The communication can be 
classified into virtual and physical presence. Virtual presence allows a social 
engineer to make contact virtually, usually through an electronic medium. 
The electronic mediums are limited to what the potential victim uses, as the 
hacker needs to contact the victim on the victim‟s virtual communication. 
Typical examples include, but are not limited to, e-mail, pop-up windows and 
telephone communications (Microsoft, 2006). 
Physical presence is less common for social engineers, but is potentially 
more effective for the hacker, as the social skills of a social engineer are 
generally superior to the average person. Physical presence is when the 
social engineer is physically in the presence of the victim. The attacks range 
from shoulder surfing, tailgating or even meaningless conversation with a 
stranger. This allows the social engineer to steer the conversation to divulge 
potentially sensitive information, or information that could be used in future 
social engineering attacks (Microsoft, 2006; Tipton, 2004, p. 239).  
As social engineering attacks are continuously evolving, the defence can 
generally not be predicted, as new innovative methods of social engineering 
are continually developing. Although the personal characteristics of 
employees are not the same, each characteristic can be exploited to aid the 
social engineer in his/her quest for information. The following subsection will 
continue to discuss human behaviour by identifying human manipulation 
attacks. 
 
3.5.2.2. Manipulation Attacks 
The simplest method of acquiring information is by simply asking for it, or by 
pretending to be someone else and then asking for it (Microsoft, 2006 ; 
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Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 3). There are four generally accepted approaches 
to manipulation, namely; intimidation, persuasion, ingratiation, and 
assistance (Microsoft, 2006). 
 Intimidation: involves the coercion of a victim to comply with a request, 
typically impersonating an authority figure (Tipton, 2004, p. 239). 
 Persuasion: involves persuading the victim to comply with a request, 
typically through the social skills of flattery or name dropping (Tipton, 
2004, pp. 238-239). 
 Ingratiation: is an effective long term attack where the hacker attempts 
to build a relationship to gain trust and exploit, typically by becoming a 
co-worker. 
 Assistance: involves the aid of the hacker to help the victim, which 
results in a short term trust relationship being formed and exploited. 
Certain employees may be more susceptible to certain types of attacks. The 
previously mentioned characteristics in Section 3.5.2 of credulity, laziness, 
good manners or enthusiasm, could be used against the employee. It is 
important to realize social engineering has little to do with an employee‟s 
intelligence. A successful social engineer has exceptional skills in 
conversations, including misleading and coercion, as a result of experience 
and practice in various types of attacks.  
Other characteristics also exist to improve success of attacks, such as 
disgruntled or dissatisfied employees. These characteristics lead to other 
types of attacks, which will be discussed in the following subsection. 
 
3.5.2.3. Exploitation of the Corrupt 
A person who is not satisfied with the working environment, or disgruntled 
due to a potential pending extermination of occupation contract, for example, 
could easily be exploited. The hacker could use the employee‟s anger to 
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his/her advantage and use this to encourage an employee to divulge 
sensitive information (DeFino, Kaufman, Valenteen, & Greenblatt, 2010, p. 
139). The hacker could also bribe the employee and a quick transaction of 
funds could lead to a successful hack (Choo, 2010). 
This indicates that, not only are the working employees a threat to 
information security, but disgruntled former employees as well. Corruption 
can thus be added to the human manipulation attacks provided in the 
previous Subsection 3.5.2.2 which include: intimidation, persuasion, 
ingratiation, and assistance. 
The protection of employees against manipulation attacks could be provided 
through education, training, and awareness. This is more commonly known as 
Security Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA). Protection against 
manipulation and corruption will be detailed in Chapter 5: Output and Suggestions, 
and Chapter 6: Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational 
Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues. 
 
3.5.3. Human Behavioural Issues in the TETRA Environment 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, organizations should have physical 
controls, technical controls and operational controls to protect the information 
assets of the organization. These physical, technical and operational controls 
should also be evident in a TETRA environment, where information assets should 
also be protected. 
The human characteristics of gullibility, laziness, good manners and enthusiasm, 
discussed in the previous subsection, are not only applicable to employees within 
an IT environment, but also applicable to TETRA users within a TETRA 
environment. Similar to users in an IT environment, TETRA users are susceptible 
to social engineering attacks and human characteristics can be exploited by social 
engineers and information assets could be at risk. The previously discussed four 
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approaches to manipulation, namely; intimidation, persuasion, ingratiation and 
assistance, are also not unique to an IT environment and can be approaches used 
by social engineers to exploit TETRA users within a TETRA network (Fouché & 
Thomson, 2011). Therefore, the discussed human behavioural issues of an IT 
environment can also be related to a TETRA environment. 
Organizations utilize employees to complete various tasks which involve using sensitive 
information. These employees have characteristics which could be exploited by social 
engineers to divulge sensitive information. The social engineers can exploit these 
characteristics in a manner where employees may not even realize they have been 
manipulated.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
Information is a vitally important asset within an organization, even referred to as the 
lifeblood of an organization. The value information provides to an organization warrants 
the reason to protect it. In order to protect information assets, information security 
controls attempt to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. 
Information assets can be protected from attacks by using information security controls, 
such as physical, technical, and operational controls. These controls should be used 
together to provide a cohesive security environment for information within an 
organization. However, the weak links in the secure environment are the employees 
handling the information.  
The unique characteristics of employees in the organization are often exploited by 
social engineers. Manipulation of employees is difficult to protect against, due to the 
highly innovative and social aspect of the attack and due to the constraint that 
employees cannot be monitored constantly. Employees are often seen as the weakest 
link and could be a threat to any organization, even those involved with Public Safety 
and Security (PSS). 
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The following chapter will elaborate on a Delphi technique, which is answered by 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) experts.  The Delphi Study focuses on the potential 
weak link of employees within a TETRA organization. The Delphi technique will be 
discussed in detail. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
This chapter states the structure within which the research was conducted. This chapter 
discusses the research process, literature review, qualitative content analysis, 
argumentation and the Delphi technique. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
Chapter 2: 
Terrestrial 
Trunked Radio
Chapter 3: The 
Human Factor of 
Information 
Security
Chapter 4: 
Research 
Methodology
Chapter 5: Output 
and Suggestions
Chapter 6: 
Guidelines
Chapter 7: 
Conclusion
 
Figure 4.1: Chapter Layout 
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“It‟s the great irony of our Information Age – the very technologies that empower us to 
create and to build also empower those who would disrupt and destroy”                         
– Barack Obama 
 
4.1. Research as a Process 
Research is identified as a search for knowledge. Kothari defines research as a 
“scientific and systematic search for pertinent information on a specific topic” (2004, p. 
1). This indicates that a researcher investigates a specific topic in a logical and 
systematic order. This chapter will discuss the logic and systematic approach used to 
research Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) and the TETRA course material at Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU). 
Chapter 1, Section 1.6, briefly discussed the research process, and two approaches 
were identified, namely quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative research approach 
involves the generation of data in a quantitative form, which is used for quantitative 
analysis. This dissertation uses the qualitative research approach, which involves the 
subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviours. Qualitative research 
allows the researcher to interpret the content based on insights and impressions during 
the investigation process (Kothari, 2004, p. 5). Further, qualitative research allows the 
researcher to utilize research techniques in a qualitative manner, such as a literature 
review based on the researcher‟s assessment and opinion. Other qualitative 
techniques, which will be used in this dissertation, include; qualitative content analysis, 
argumentation, and the Delphi technique.  
The research process consists of a series of actions or steps to effectively carry out the 
process, such as defining a research problem, reviewing known literature, formulating a 
hypothesis, designing of research, and reporting findings (Kothari, 2004, pp. 10-12). 
The research process, used for this dissertation, is as follows: 
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 Define research problem; 
The primary research problem was defined in Chapter 1 as „protection against the 
exploitation of the human factor is not considered in the TETRA educational 
programme which could lead to a breach in the secure communications of TETRA 
infrastructures‟. In addition, Chapter 1 elaborated on secondary objectives, which 
are used to support the primary problem. 
 Review literature; 
Known literature was extensively reviewed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, which 
reviewed TETRA networks and the human factor of information security, 
independently. The first literature review investigated TETRA and provided an 
overview of the TETRA standard. The second literature review was conducted to 
investigate the human factor in information security, commonly found in IT 
environments. A third literature review will be discussed in Chapter 6 to investigate 
possible countermeasures to the research problem. 
 Formulate hypothesis; 
The hypothesis was formulated after the first literature review was conducted on the 
TETRA documentation from EADS. The hypothesis is used by the researcher as a 
guide for further investigation during the progress of this dissertation. The hypothesis 
indicated that TETRA users could fall victim to human manipulation attacks, which 
are more commonly found in Information Technology (IT) environments. 
 Research Design; 
This chapter serves as the research design chapter, which will discuss the following 
research techniques; qualitative content analysis, argumentation, the Delphi 
technique, and Elite Interviews. These techniques will be discussed in further detail 
in later sections of this chapter. These techniques attempt to answer the previously 
mentioned secondary research objectives, which will directly support the primary 
research problem. 
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 and, Report findings. 
The report of findings is done by writing the chapters of this document. 
The following sections will discuss the literature review, qualitative content analysis, 
argumentation, and the Delphi technique in further detail. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
As identified in the previous section, review of known literature is one of the first tasks in 
the research process. A literature review allows the researcher to acquaint 
himself/herself with the body of knowledge available for the specific topic; therefore, two 
literature reviews were conducted. The first literature review investigated TETRA 
networks and the second investigated the human factor of information security. Another 
literature review will be conducted in Chapter 6, whereby countermeasures against 
human manipulation attacks will be explored. 
A literature review can aid the researcher in the following ways: 
 Clarify and focus on the research problem; 
Reviewing literature allows the researcher to learn what aspects of the research 
area have been examined, what findings were concluded, what gaps have been 
identified by others, and what suggestions have been identified for further research. 
This allows the researcher to gain greater insight into the research problem and 
provide clarity as well as focus in the research problem area (Kumar, 2011, p. 32). 
 Improve the methodology of research; 
Reviewing literature allows the researcher to become familiar with research 
methodologies used by other researchers, allowing the researcher to improve 
his/her methodologies during the research process (Kumar, 2011, pp. 32-33). 
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 Broaden the body of knowledge in the specified research area; 
Reviewing literature ensures the researcher is acquainted with the body of 
knowledge in the specific research area (Kumar, 2011, p. 33). 
 Enables findings to be contextualized. 
A literature review enables the researcher to compare findings with other 
researchers‟ findings, which are important when placing results in context of the 
body of knowledge in the specified research area (Kumar, 2011, p. 33). 
The literature reviews are qualitatively used to strengthen arguments, which will be 
done in Chapter 6. The following section will discuss how qualitative content analysis 
can be used to find qualitative evidence. 
 
4.3. Qualitative Content Analysis 
Content analysis can be defined as a systematic and objective analysis of 
characteristics in content, which can be done with different varieties of techniques of 
content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002, pp. 1-2). Krippendorff identifies content analysis as 
a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to contexts 
of their use” and identifies that the main focus of content analysis is to examine data, 
texts, and images in order to interpret what they mean (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18). 
Content analysis can be used in either a quantitative or qualitative approach, depending 
on how the technique is used. Qualitative researchers will support their interpretations 
of the content by using quotes from the analysed literature into their findings to support 
the researcher‟s argument (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 87-88).  
Content analysis was used in a qualitative way in this dissertation for the researcher to 
prepare a specific problem question and analyse the current content in an attempt to 
answer the problem question. These questions are thematically used throughout the 
content to analyse if the problem question can be answered. The researcher could then 
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interpret content in a qualitative way so that the current content answers the problem 
question.  
Qualitative content analysis will be further discussed in Chapter 5, whereby an 
investigation of NMMU‟s TETRA course material will be done with relation to the 
information security controls, which were discussed in Chapter 3. Physical, technical 
and operational security will be analysed in the NMMU TETRA course material and 
findings will be concluded in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4. Argumentation 
Arguments are the instruments used for rational persuasion and reasoning. A complete 
argument has multiple sections to indicate the rational flow of the argument, namely, 
premise, inference and conclusion. A conclusion of the argument is a claim that is 
meant to be supported by factual reasons, forming the core section of an argument. A 
premise is a claim that is used as the factual reason for a conclusion in an argument, 
which could consist of multiple claims or premises. Therefore, an argument could be 
identified as a conclusion with a supporting premise. An inference is the thought 
process whereby the researcher moves from a premise, or multiple premises, to a 
conclusion (Munson & Black, 2012, pp. 1-2).  
Argumentation is used throughout this dissertation to logically align the researcher‟s 
opinion on arguable topics. The following section will elaborate on the Delphi technique 
and how it was used in this dissertation. 
 
4.5. The Delphi Technique 
The Delphi technique is a method that was originally developed in the 1950s and 
gradually revised to fit current academic needs for gathering data through an iterative 
process. The Delphi technique, also known as the Delphi method or Delphi study, is 
initially defined as an effective technique for structuring a group communication process 
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so that a group of individuals could deal with a complex problem (Linstone & Turoff, 
1975, p. 3). Today, the Delphi technique is refined to an iterative process to collect 
anonymous judgments of experts using a series of data collection and analysis 
techniques through multiple rounds combined with feedback of the experts (Skulmoski, 
Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The Delphi technique aims to gather opinions from carefully 
selected experts, through means such as questionnaires. The experts are sent a 
questionnaire and the responses are received by the researcher. The researcher 
collates the responses and requests further feedback, from the same experts, by doing 
repeating rounds of the same questionnaire, but with the other experts‟ feedback visible 
from the second round onwards. This iterative process ends when the feedback 
reaches a consensus or sufficient information has been exchanged between the experts 
and researcher (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). 
The Delphi technique is characterized by four key features (Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007): 
 Anonymity of Delphi participants; 
This allows the participants to freely express their opinions without social pressure 
from peers or groups. The responses are assessed on their merit, rather than the 
influence that the responding person has on the other participants. 
 Iteration; 
This allows the participants to refine their feedback and opinions during the 
repeating rounds when all the participants‟ feedback is visible to everyone. 
 Controlled feedback; 
This allows the participants to notice the other participants‟ perspectives and 
opinions, while remaining anonymous. This also allows the participants the 
opportunity to clarify and change their original opinion in the feedback. 
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 Statistical aggregation of group response. 
This allows for optional quantitative analysis of the received data or allows the 
researcher to interpret the data by combining the feedback. 
The Delphi technique will be further discussed in Chapter 5 and will detail how it was 
tailored for the needs of the researcher and this dissertation.  
 
4.6. Elite Interview 
According to the Oxford Dictionaries Online; „Elite‟ is identified as a group of people that 
are considered superior, while „Interview‟ is identified as a session of formal questions 
(2012a; 2012b). This indicates exactly what the Elite Interview will aim to achieve, 
namely; a session of formal questions with a group of people that are identified as 
superior. However, an Elite Interview is better known as a method that allows the 
researcher to ask a group of people questions in an effort to obtain specific information 
(Dexter, 2006, p. 4). For the purpose of this research, the „Elite‟ group of people will be 
TETRA trainers at the NMMU TETRA Academy and the „Interview‟ will be a session of 
formal questions to evaluate the proposed solution for the primary research problem. 
The evaluation will provide the TETRA trainers with the developed solution and will 
determine if the trainers can easily understand the solution, if the trainers have any 
recommendations to improve the solution and if the trainers believe that the solution will 
address the primary research problem of this dissertation. 
The Elite Interview will be further discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.5. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
Research allows a problematic topic to be investigated in a logical and systematic order, 
which allows researchers to resolve the problematic issues in the research area by 
using various research techniques. The problem area in TETRA is arguably a new 
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issue, which was identified by relating security problems of an IT environment to a 
TETRA network. Therefore, evidence of known TETRA manipulation exploits is not 
commonly found in literature. The research techniques of literature review, qualitative 
content analysis, argumentation, and Delphi technique allow new research to be 
conducted and utilized in the body of knowledge for TETRA. This allows the research 
problem of this dissertation, and possibly future research, to be substantiated by the 
findings in the dissertation. 
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Chapter 5: Output and Suggestions 
This chapter elaborates on the Delphi technique and qualitative content analysis 
research techniques. The usage and findings of the research techniques are reported in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
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Information 
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Conclusion
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“The social engineer – an unscrupulous magician who has you watching his left hand 
while with his right he steals your secrets” – Kevin Mitnick 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The investigation of the body of knowledge of Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) and 
the human factor of information security, using the previously discussed literature 
review, introduced the possibility of TETRA being susceptible to human manipulation 
attacks. Research techniques, discussed in Chapter 4, will be used to argue towards 
the susceptibility of TETRA to human manipulation attacks. The research techniques 
include a Delphi technique and qualitative content analysis. The Delphi technique will 
investigate the susceptibility of TETRA networks to human manipulation attacks by 
means of questioning a group of TETRA experts. The qualitative content analysis will 
investigate the extent to which the current TETRA educational programme addresses 
security issues. Both these research techniques will be used to address the primary 
research objective. 
 
5.2. The Delphi Technique 
The Delphi technique, as described in the previous chapter, is utilized by researchers in 
many different ways, as no typical structure exists for a Delphi technique. Therefore, the 
technique can be tailored to specifically meet the requirements of the researcher.  
The following subsection will discuss the tailoring of a Delphi technique to investigate 
the susceptibility of human manipulation attacks in TETRA networks. 
 
5.2.1. Customized Delphi Technique 
Section 4.5, Chapter 4 discussed the characteristics of a Delphi technique, such 
as anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback, and statistical aggregation of group 
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responses, which form the core of a Delphi technique and will also be part of this 
customized version of a Delphi technique. The Delphi technique is used to 
electronically gather feedback from identified TETRA experts, who are kept 
anonymous through the various iteration rounds. 
The Delphi participants should be experts regarding the topic under investigation, 
they should be well-informed about the topic and they should be open to 
discussion regarding the topic in question (Jairath & Weinstein, 1994). Therefore, 
with these criteria in mind, and for the purposes of this dissertation, five experts 
were selected from the active field in TETRA. The number of participants in a 
Delphi study largely depends on the purpose of the research (Taylor-Powell, 
2002). The people chosen for this study were identified as experts in the field of 
TETRA, as they have all worked extensively in the TETRA environment. The 
primary employment responsibility of four of the participants is directly related to 
TETRA, while the fifth participant has facilitated a large TETRA project. 
These experts were sent a notification email of their selection and directed to an 
online questionnaire for the first round. The online questionnaire introduced the 
process of a Delphi technique and assured the anonymity of each participant, 
which encourages free expression of opinion. The second round of the Delphi 
technique did not use an online questionnaire, as the feedback from all the experts 
from the first round was sent to each expert. An individualized Microsoft Office 
document was prepared for each expert of the first round, which included tables of 
feedback from all experts from the first round of the Delphi technique. Only two 
rounds were executed for the Delphi technique, as enough information was 
extracted from the process to conclude the susceptibility of TETRA networks to 
human manipulation attacks. 
The requested feedback from the experts included a rating from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) in Likert scale format, as well as additional 
comments from the experts where necessary.  The ratings along with the 
interpreted comments were gathered for the answered sections. The first and 
second round of the Delphi technique requested five sections of feedback, which 
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included: personal information, opinion on Scenario 1, opinion on Scenario 2, 
opinion on Scenario 3, and opinion on a final question. The personal information 
section feedback was not gathered and attached for the second round of the 
Delphi study, to respect the anonymity of the experts. The sections included the 
following: 
 Personal Information; 
The personal information of first name, last name, and email address was 
requested for management and verification purposes only. Additional 
information such as the expert‟s own assessment of TETRA knowledge was 
requested in the format of 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent), along with an indication of 
how many years the expert was involved with TETRA. 
 Scenario 1 – Technology Based Deception; 
A scenario was structured to guide the possibility of a technology based 
manipulation attack on a TETRA network and requested the experts to indicate 
their opinion of plausibility that such a scenario could be successful. The 
requested answer included a Likert scale rating of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) and mandatory comments to support the provided rating. The 
scenario was as follows: 
„A dispatcher, working at a dispatching center for a TETRA network, receives a 
gift parcel at work. The attached note indicates it is a gift from a superior to the 
dispatcher for outstanding performance. The gift contains a USB Rubber 
Ducky. The dispatcher then proceeds to plug the USB Rubber Ducky into the 
PC which is used as the Dispatcher Work Station (DWS). The automatic 
deployment of the USB Rubber Ducky's payload allows the malicious hacker to 
compromise the TETRA network. For example, a script could be executed to 
change the system settings on the DWS to disable TETRA terminals.‟ 
A Universal Serial Bus (USB) Rubber Ducky is a device that looks exactly like a 
regular USB flash drive, but contains a 60MHz 32-bit processor and an 
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integrated scripting language. The Rubber Ducky allows users to create 
payloads capable of changing system settings, opening back doors, retrieving 
data, and almost anything that is possible when having physical access to a 
work station (Hak5, 2012). It is possible that a USB Rubber Ducky could, for 
example, crash a DWS and cut off communication to TETRA users. The USB 
Rubber Ducky is a technically advanced tool for social engineers and hackers, 
as it manipulates people into thinking it is a regular USB flash drive. The USB 
Rubber Ducky and the embedded code cannot be detected or removed by 
antivirus applications, as the tool is installed as a Human Interface Device 
(HID) on a physical computer and provides the possibility of changing settings 
in the same manner as a criminal with physical access to an unlocked 
computer. This scenario indicates a possible attack vector on a live TETRA 
network, which requires an employee to be manipulated into thinking the USB 
Rubber Ducky is a gift and that it appears to be something it is not. The 
example of the USB Rubber Ducky in the Technology Based Deception 
scenario should not be seen as the primary focus of this scenario. Rather, it 
should be seen as a possible example where TETRA users could be 
manipulated to circumvent technical security controls. The plausibility of the 
manipulation of TETRA users with regard to technical controls in the TETRA 
network is in question for the success of such a technology based manipulation 
attack. 
 Scenario 2 – Human Based Deception; 
A scenario was presented to the experts regarding the possibility of a human 
based manipulation attack on a TETRA network and requested the experts to 
indicate their opinion of plausibility that such a scenario could be successful. 
The requested answer included a Likert scale rating of 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree) and mandatory comments to support the provided rating. 
The scenario was as follows: 
„A TETRA terminal user, such as a police officer with a handheld TETRA 
terminal, is approached by the malicious hacker posing as a support 
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technician. The hacker explains that there have been a few problems with 
some of the TETRA terminals and requests that the police officer hands over 
the TETRA terminal to allow for testing. The willing police officer gives the 
terminal to the hacker, who then proceeds to plug the terminal into a laptop 
using a Peripheral Equipment Interface (PEI). The laptop has software installed 
to crack security on the terminal and clone sensitive information.‟ 
Manipulation of a TETRA user could potentially lead to an exploit of a secure 
system. The previously discussed scenario provides an example of how a 
person could potentially manipulate a TETRA user into thinking that the person 
is a support technician for the police. The posing technician manipulates the 
TETRA user into thinking the person is a support technician for the police and 
receives the police TETRA equipment from the TETRA user, which could be 
considered a successful attack. The plausibility of the manipulation of 
TETRA users in the TETRA network is in question for the success of such a 
human based manipulation attack. 
 Scenario 3 – Corruption Based Deception; 
A scenario was presented to the experts regarding a corruption based 
manipulation attack on a TETRA network and requested the experts to indicate 
their opinion of plausibility that such a scenario could be successful. The 
requested answer included a Likert scale rating of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) and mandatory comments to support the provided rating. The 
scenario was as follows: 
„A dispatcher or terminal user, such as a police officer with a handheld TETRA 
terminal, is notified of pending employment dismissal or overlooked for a 
deserving promotion. This could result in the employee becoming disgruntled 
with the employer. The disgruntled employee could be approached by 
competitors or criminal organizations and bribed to perform malicious acts. The 
disgruntled employee could, for example, report locations of specific terminal 
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users, warn about possible raid events, and the disgruntled employee could 
enable or disable terminals briefly.‟ 
A disgruntled or corrupt employee could lead to sabotage or compromise of 
any secure network. An unsatisfied employee could be approached by 
competitors or criminal organizations and bribed or manipulated to perform 
malicious acts on the network. The plausibility of the bribery / manipulation 
of TETRA users in the TETRA network is in question for the success of such a 
corruption based manipulation attack. 
 Final Question. 
The Final Question attempts to answer the secondary research question of 
how susceptible TETRA networks are to human manipulation attacks. The 
requested answer included a Likert scale rating of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) and mandatory comments to support the provided rating. The 
Final Question was stated as follows: 
Do you believe TETRA networks are susceptible to human manipulation 
attacks, which are commonly used to exploit vulnerabilities in IT environments? 
The Delphi technique was executed over a period of six weeks to gather all the 
information from the experts, combine the feedback and construct a personalized 
document for each expert in the second round of the Delphi technique. This gave 
the experts adequate time to answer the sections. 
The following subsection will discuss the results provided by the anonymous 
experts, which is used to answer the secondary objective of investigating the 
susceptibility of TETRA networks to human manipulation attacks. 
 
5.2.2. Delphi Technique Results – Round 1 
The gathering of personal information indicated the amount of years the experts 
have been involved with TETRA. The number of years that experts have been 
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involved with TETRA ranged from 4 years to 20 years. The average among the 
five experts is 10.6 years involvement in TETRA, indicating a highly experienced 
group of experts. 
The results of the three scenarios and the Final Question were summarized and 
collated into a table for each section. It is important to realize the individual ratings 
provided do not necessarily represent the final interpretation of the answer 
provided by each participant, as some of the experts‟ comments seem to 
contradict the rating they gave for a scenario or question.  The answers of the 
experts for the technology based deception of Scenario 1, which was discussed in 
the previous subsection, are provided in Table 5.1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
87 Output and Suggestions 
Scenario 1 - Technology Based Deception 
 Participan
t 1 
Participant 
2 
Participant 
3 
Participant 
4 
Participan
t 5 
Rating 2 2 4 2 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment
s 
Participant 
does not 
believe it is 
so easy to 
compromis
e a TETRA 
network, 
however, 
many 
things are 
possible 
with 
today‟s 
technology 
Participant 
believes that 
an unlikely 
set of 
circumstance
s need to be 
synchronized 
for this 
situation to 
be real. 
Participant 
believes the 
attack has 
technical 
merit and is 
theoretically 
possible, but 
lacks 
practical 
application 
Participant 
believes 
that if the 
physical 
system is 
not 
physically 
protected 
against the 
connection 
of 
unauthorize
d devices, 
then this 
scenario is 
very 
possible 
Participant 
believes 
that this 
deception 
depends on 
the TETRA 
knowledge 
and access 
that the 
criminal 
may have to 
the specific 
network and 
configuratio
n software. 
Proper fleet 
mapping 
and 
encryption 
prohibits 
even 
manufactur
er 
employees 
with access 
Participant 
believes 
that there 
are many 
different 
types of 
DWSs in 
the 
TETRA 
market, 
with 
varying 
levels of 
security 
Consensus does not exist for the plausibility of this kind of manipulation 
Table 5.1: Scenario 1 - Technology Deception 
The overall ratings provided by the experts indicate a consensus that the experts 
disagree with this scenario‟s plausibility. However, the comments indicated by 
Participant 1 and Participant 2 include that the scenario is plausible. Therefore, 
consensus does not exist between the participants for Scenario 1. Thus, this 
requires a second round of the Delphi technique. The human based deception of 
Scenario 2 provided the following information after the first round. 
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Scenario 2 - Human Based Deception 
 Participant 
1 
Participant 
2 
Participant 
3 
Participant 
4 
Participant 
5 
Rating 5 1 5 3 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments 
Participant 
believes 
when 
humans are 
involved in 
such an 
attack 
vector, that 
anything is 
possible 
Participant 
believes 
that the 
information 
obtainable 
through this 
type of 
attack 
would be of 
little 
practical 
use. 
Participant 
believes 
TETRA 
caters for 
this type of 
attack 
Participant 
believes 
that 
security of 
a network 
is very 
reliant on 
good 
training and 
integrity, 
however, 
the human 
factor 
remains the 
weakest 
link even 
for TETRA 
Participant 
believes 
that a 
hacker 
might be 
able to 
obtain 
knowledge 
such as 
operating 
channels, 
fleet 
numbers 
and unit ID, 
but not 
sufficient to 
crack 
security 
codes and 
encryption 
of the 
terminal 
and 
network 
Participant 
believes 
that 
accredited 
TETRA 
terminals 
for the 
major 
public 
safety 
TETRA 
networks 
have been 
tested 
against 
such 
attacks 
Consensus does not exist for the plausibility of this kind of manipulation 
Table 5.2: Scenario 2 - Human Deception 
The overall ratings and comments indicate that a consensus does not exist 
between the participants. Therefore, a second round of the Delphi technique is 
necessary. The corruption based deception of Scenario 3 provided the following 
information after the first round. 
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Scenario 3 - Corruption Based Deception 
 Participa
nt 1 
Participant 2 Participan
t 3 
Participa
nt 4 
Participant 5 
Rating 4 4 5 2 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment
s 
Participant 
believes 
when an 
employee 
is very 
unsatisfied 
with 
his/her 
situation, 
combined 
with the 
right 
moment, 
mood, and 
external 
irritant, 
this is very 
plausible 
Participant 
believes that 
this kind of 
scenario is 
possible and 
even highly 
likely in 
TETRA 
networks, 
equally likely 
with any other 
communicatio
n system 
Participant 
believes 
that 
disgruntled 
or corrupt 
employees 
with 
access to 
the TETRA 
network 
could 
sabotage 
or 
compromis
e the 
TETRA 
network 
Participant 
believes 
that the 
behaviour 
and 
activity of 
every 
terminal is 
monitored 
and 
recorded, 
however, 
it may be 
possible 
for a 
corrupt 
user to 
gain 
access to 
groups. 
However, 
it will be 
noticed by 
legal 
users and 
the 
dispatcher 
is able to 
„stun‟ such 
a user. 
Participant 
believes that 
all 
information a 
legal user 
has access 
to can also 
be 
communicate
d through 
other 
mediums. 
However, all 
dispatcher 
actions are 
tracked, 
which 
exposes 
malicious 
behaviour as 
well as 
access to 
groups. 
Consensus exists for the plausibility of this kind of manipulation 
Table 5.3: Scenario 3 - Corruption Deception 
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The overall ratings and comments indicate that a consensus does exist for the 
plausibility of corruption in a TETRA network. A second round for this scenario is 
not technically needed, but was included in the second round for additional 
information to be provided. The Final Question of susceptibility of human 
manipulation attacks in a TETRA network provided the following information after 
the first round. 
The Final Question 
 Participant 
1 
Participant 
2 
Participant 
3 
Participant 4 Participa
nt 5 
Rating 5 1 5 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Comment
s 
Participant 
believes 
that every 
network is 
susceptible 
to human 
manipulatio
n 
Participant 
believes 
that 
TETRA, 
similarly as 
any other 
technology, 
can be 
susceptible 
to human 
manipulatio
n attacks 
Participant 
believes 
that the air 
interface 
and 
backhaul 
TETRA 
system is 
secure and 
the IT 
component 
is physically 
and 
electronicall
y protected. 
However, 
the users 
with access 
are not 
secured 
and could 
compromis
e TETRA 
networks 
Participant 
believes that 
the worst 
case of 
manipulation 
is possibly 
interference 
that could 
make 
communicatio
n non usable 
Participant 
believes 
that 
humans 
are always 
the 
weakest 
link. 
However, 
specific 
TETRA 
networks 
have tools 
to limit the 
extent of 
the 
damage 
Consensus exists for the plausibility of this kind of manipulation 
Table 5.4: Final Question 
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The rating indicated by Participant 2 for the Final Question is one out of five, for 
strongly disagree. However, the comments provided by Participant 2 indicated that 
the participant believes TETRA is susceptible to human manipulation attacks. The 
reasoning for this value and comment indication is unknown, but this indicates that 
a consensus exists between the experts for agreeing that TETRA networks are 
susceptible to human manipulation attacks. The following subsection will discuss 
the second round of the Delphi technique in further detail. 
 
5.2.3. Delphi Technique Results – Round 2 
The same experts from the first round of the Delphi technique were used for the 
second round.  In the second round, all the comments and information provided by 
the experts in the first round were distributed to all the experts. A document was 
developed for the second round, which included the information in table format, 
similar to the previous first round tables of Subsection 5.2.2. However, the experts 
were kept anonymous to prohibit influence from known peers amongst the group 
of experts.  
The second round concluded minimal changes by each of the experts, indicating 
that the information provided in the first round of the Delphi technique remained 
unchanged. The following paragraphs will discuss the lack of consensus between 
the experts in the scenarios: 
 Scenario 1 – Technology Based Deception; 
The first scenario discussed the possibility of a technology based human 
manipulation attack by utilizing a USB Rubber Ducky to deceive a dispatcher, 
as mentioned in Section 5.2.1. Participants 3 and 5 believed that the scenario is 
plausible. However, participants 1, 2 and 4 indicated that the scenario is not 
very plausible. Participants 1 and 2 did, however, provide an opinion that the 
scenario is theoretically possible, but participant 2 felt it lacked practical 
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application. Therefore, consensus was not reached for this Scenario 1 after two 
rounds of the Delphi technique.  
The focus of the question with regard to Scenario 1 was to determine whether a 
human manipulation attack that exploits technical controls is plausible.  With 
regard to the lack of consensus between the participants, it is possible that the 
attack scenario was analysed too literally by participants 1, 2 and 4. The 
scenario did not detail what the attacker would achieve by using the Rubber 
Ducky device.  For example, a script on the Rubber Ducky could have run that 
would have crashed the Dispatcher Work Station and executed a Denial of 
Service attack.  This would have impacted the availability of information. 
 Scenario 2 – Human Based Deception; 
The second scenario discussed the plausibility of a human based manipulation 
attack where an attacker impersonated a support technician to deceive a 
TETRA terminal user, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1. Participants 1 and 3 
believed the scenario is plausible. However, participants 2, 4 and 5 indicated 
that the scenario is not very plausible. Participants 2 and 4 did, however, 
indicate that information could be obtained in this scenario, indicating it is 
indeed possible, but lacks beneficial information for the attacker. Participant 5 
indicated that the TETRA network has been tested against such a scenario.  
However, it can be argued that the actions and behaviour of each individual, 
and, consequently, each TETRA user, is different.  Therefore, this breach of 
operational security cannot be tested against. Consensus was not reached for 
Scenario 2 after two rounds of the Delphi technique. 
 Scenario 3 – Corruption Based Deception; 
The third scenario discussed the possibility of a corruption based human 
manipulation attack by exploiting a disgruntled employee, as mentioned in 
Section 5.2.1. Participants 1, 2, 3 and 5 believed that the scenario is plausible.  
However, participant 4 indicated that the scenario is not very plausible 
Participant 4 indicated that, while it may be possible for a corrupt user to gain 
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access, the attack will be noticed by legal users, who can handle the attack. 
Therefore, consensus was reached for Scenario 3 after two rounds of the 
Delphi technique. 
 and, Final Question. 
The Final Question focused on how susceptible TETRA networks are to human 
manipulation attacks, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1. Participants 1, 3 and 5 
believed that TETRA is susceptible. However, with regard to the rating given, 
participants 2 and 4 indicated that TETRA is not susceptible to human 
manipulation attacks. However, participants 2 and 4 did indicate that they 
believed TETRA is susceptible to human manipulation attacks, similar to other 
communication technologies. Participant 4 believed that the worst case of 
manipulation could cause interference to TETRA communication. Although the 
ratings of participants 2 and 4 were low, the opinions expressed by these 
participants indicated that they agree TETRA is susceptible to human 
manipulation attacks. Therefore, consensus was reached for this question after 
two rounds of the Delphi technique. 
Further rounds of the Delphi technique were not required, as the second round 
yielded no notable differences to the first round, which lead the researcher to 
ignore any further rounds for the Delphi technique.  
The results provided from the Delphi technique indicate that the TETRA experts, who 
have on average over 10years experience in the field of TETRA, believe human 
manipulation attacks are possible in TETRA networks. The results also indicated that 
some of the TETRA experts believed the provided examples of human manipulation 
attack scenarios could be plausible. This proves the human factor could be a possible 
threat to TETRA networks. The results from the Delphi technique answer the secondary 
question from Chapter 1, namely, are TETRA networks susceptible to human 
manipulation attacks? 
As it has been established through the Delphi technique that TETRA is susceptible to 
human manipulation attacks, as are most technologies, the following section will 
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investigate a qualitative content analysis of the EADS TETRA course material, which is 
offered at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU). The question if TETRA 
networks are susceptible to human manipulation attacks has been answered in this 
section and now an investigation is required to find out to what extent security is 
addressed in the TETRA courses offered at the NMMU. 
 
5.3. NMMU TETRA Course Content Analysis 
Human manipulation attacks need not be limited to Information Technology (IT) 
environments. Various other technologies and mediums can also be affected, due to the 
human involvement and manipulation aspect of social engineering. Social engineers 
have used social engineering attacks to gain access into many well protected 
organizations and networks, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), through telephone conversations (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, 
p. xii). This means that TETRA networks, even with advanced physical and technical 
security, cannot be exempted from potential human manipulation attacks. 
This section will evaluate the secondary objective from Chapter 1, namely, „to what 
extent does the current TETRA educational programme at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University (NMMU) address security issues.‟ A qualitative content analysis 
of the TETRA courses offered at the NMMU was conducted. The security aspects 
related to physical, technical, and operational were qualitatively assessed.  
The courses offered at the NMMU consist of four different modules, namely: Radio Unit 
Operating, End User System, TETRA Base Station, and Dispatcher Work Station. The 
courses will be evaluated and a summary will be provided in the following subsections. 
The summary will not detail the complete overview of each course, as only relevant 
information to the question of physical, technical and operation security will be 
addressed.  
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5.3.1. Radio Unit Operating Course (RUO) 
The Radio Unit Operating course includes information about the various accepted 
terminals to be used by TETRA networks for different types of users. The users 
have the option to use TETRA terminals for handheld, mobile mounted, or data 
purposes (EADS Defence & Security, 2008a, pp. 1-231).  
The RUO course introduces various EADS TETRA terminals, including the EADS 
THR880, TMR880, and TDR880 series, as detailed in Section 2.5.1, of Chapter 2. 
A few TETRA terminals include physical security against electronic ignition of fire 
and explosive materials, which allows the TETRA terminals with the intrinsically 
safe security feature to be utilized in explosion sensitive environments. The EADS 
TETRA terminals are manufactured with hard-coated polycarbonate glass 
displays, which have increased protection for the TETRA terminal‟s display screen. 
This also includes the feature of shock resistance, and water and dust protection 
for the TETRA terminals. This can be seen as physical security for the TETRA 
terminals, as shock, water or dust cannot hinder the operation of the TETRA 
terminal. 
The TETRA terminals have a technical security function to use smart cards for 
TETRA terminal based End-to-End Encryption (E2EE). Along with this security the 
TETRA terminal allows the smart card to be controlled by a separate application 
through the TETRA terminal‟s Peripheral Equipment Interface (PEI). The 
encryption, as mentioned in Section 2.7.2, Chapter 2, allows traffic to be kept 
confidential while it is transmitted within the TETRA network. The TETRA terminal 
allows mutual authentication between the TETRA terminal and TETRA Base 
Station (TBS). Alerts can also be triggered when a TETRA terminal is out of 
network coverage. These alerts can notify the TETRA terminal user and the 
dispatcher monitoring a TETRA terminal. The TETRA terminals can be protected 
with a timer based phone code, which protects the phone after the pre-defined 
time has elapsed. A phone code must be provided before operation can continue 
on the TETRA terminal. The TETRA terminals can also be protected with a 
security code, which is required to be provided to the TETRA terminal after 
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numerous incorrect phone codes have been provided. The security code is also 
required before factory default settings can be reset on a TETRA terminal. The 
THR9 terminals, and later versions, support Taqto functions. The Taqto function 
allows easy programming and updating of pre-configured actions, such as 
automatically commanding the TETRA terminal to send an emergency text to 
dispatchers while TETRA users are in distress. The data TETRA terminals require 
security codes as part of commands for operation. The data TETRA terminals also 
include the following technical security features of authentication, air interface 
encryption, and the option to enable or disable the data TETRA terminals. 
Table 5.5 is a summary of the evaluated security aspects which are related to 
physical, technical and operational security. 
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Radio Unit 
Operating 
(ROU) 
 
Physical Security 
 
Technical Security 
 
Operational 
Security 
 
 
Page 7 
 
 
Smart cards for 
terminal based 
E2EE 
 
 
 
Page 11 
Intrinsically safe 
terminals 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 50 
 
 
Security codes 
required for data 
terminal commands 
 
 
 
Page 56 
 
 
Data terminals need 
authentication and 
encryption 
 
 
 
Page 108 
 Taqto easy 
programming pre-
defined actions 
 
 
 
Page 131 
Hard-coated 
polycarbonate glass 
display 
  
 
 
Page 131 
Shock resistance, 
water and dust 
protection 
  
 
 
Page 136 
 Terminal can be 
timer or phone code 
protected 
 
 
 
Page 139 
 Security code is 
required if phone 
code incorrect 
 
 
 
Page 205 
 Mutual 
authentication and 
alert for out of range 
 
Table 5.5: Radio Unit Operating 
Table 5.5 shows the page numbers of the RUO course where physical, technical 
and operational security has been discussed or mentioned. As can be seen from 
the table, there were no findings of any operational security aspects in the course. 
The following subsection will evaluate the End User System course.  
  
98 Output and Suggestions 
5.3.2. End User System Course (EUS) 
The End User System course introduces TETRA and the origin of the standard. 
The course discusses various components of the network abbreviations and the 
interoperability of the standard (EADS Defence & Security, 2009b, pp. 1-217).  
The EUS course introduces the origin of the TETRA standard and elaborates on 
technical network aspects and features. The EUS course mentions intrinsically 
safe operation features of specific TETRA terminals. As mentioned in the previous 
subsection, intrinsically safe operation refers to the inability of fire or explosions to 
ignite from intrinsically safe TETRA terminals. The DWS also supports physical 
security in the form of optional locked DWS devices that require a smart card to be 
inserted before the device is unlocked. 
The EUS course elaborates on the various TETRA security functions, which are 
deemed part of technical security aspects, throughout the course. TETRA details 
authentication requirements to various devices, such as the TETRA terminals and 
Dispatcher Work Station (DWS) devices. This typically includes the use of a pre-
defined username, password, or pin code. The information from TETRA devices is 
also encrypted, as also mentioned in the previous subsection; however traffic from 
the DWS can also be encrypted. The encryption can be done using various Cipher 
Keys, which are discussed in more detail in Section 2.7.2, Chapter 2. When the 
connection between a TETRA Base Station (TBS) and a Digital Exchange (DXT) 
fails, the TBS can continue operation by entering the TBS Fallback mode. When 
new TETRA terminals enter the coverage of the TBS, their authentication details 
are recorded and allowed to communicate in the coverage area. When normal 
operation between DXT and TBS resumes the authentication is challenged to 
ensure legitimate TETRA terminals are using the TETRA network. The 
dispatchers, using DWS devices, can activate Ambience Listening on specified 
TETRA terminals. Ambience Listening allows the dispatcher to remotely listen to 
what is happening around the TETRA terminal, which could typically be used 
during a hostage situation. The dispatcher can also enable or disable TETRA 
terminals which are part of the organization, which could be done to compromised 
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TETRA terminals. The administrator of a TETRA network can purposefully hide 
certain organizations from dispatchers, making them appear invisible to 
dispatchers. Specific traffic on the TETRA network can be selected and recorded, 
using the Archive Recording security feature of TETRA. Authorized users in the 
TETRA network can track changes made in the TETRA network, such as devices 
logging on or off, activities of TETRA users, TETRA groups, and TETRA 
organizations. The TBS can detect when a jamming signal is transmitting in the 
coverage area of the TBS and an alert can be signaled to the DXT. 
The following table is a summary of the evaluated security aspects which are 
related to physical, technical and operational security controls. 
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End User 
System 
(EUS) 
 
Physical Security 
 
Technical Security 
 
Operational 
Security 
 
 
Page 29 
 Terminal 
authentication and 
device encryption 
 
 
 
Page 58 
 TBS Fallback when 
network fault 
detected to DXT 
 
 
 
Page 61 
 
Intrinsically safe 
Terminals 
  
 
 
Page 194 
  
 
Cipher Keys 
 
 
 
Page 196 
 DWS requires 
username and 
password 
 
 
 
Page 196 
Access to DWS 
requires optional 
smart card 
  
 
 
Page 198 
  
 
Ambience Listening 
 
 
 
Page 200 
  
Terminal enable or 
disable 
 
 
 
Page 202 
  
Hidden 
organizations 
 
 
 
Page 203 
  
 
Archive Recording 
 
 
 
Page 206 
  
 
Logging of events 
 
 
 
Page 208 
 TBS Jamming 
Detection for 
interfering signals 
 
Table 5.6: End User System 
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Table 5.6 shows the page numbers of the EUS course where physical, technical 
and operational security controls were discussed or mentioned. As can be seen 
from the table, there were no findings of any operational security aspects in the 
course. The following subsection will evaluate the TETRA Base Station course. 
 
5.3.3. TETRA Base Station Course (TB3) 
The TETRA Base Station course includes the product range, configurations and 
component information about the base stations in a TETRA network. The base 
stations in the course include: TBS, TB3 and TB3c. TB3 refers to TETRA Base 
Station 3rd generation, while the TB3c refers the compact version of the TB3 
(EADS Defence & Security, 2010, pp. 1-423). 
The TB3 course includes various TETRA Base Station (TBS) devices and 
elaborates on the technical features and implementation guidance. The TBS 
devices require physical keys to physically unlock the hinged front doors of 
cabinets, which house the components of the TBS device.  
The TB3 course also elaborates on previously mentioned technical security 
aspects of encryption between the TBS and Digital Exchange for TETRA for IP 
(DXT). Encryption was discussed in the previous subsections and in Section 2.7.2, 
Chapter 2. The TBS cabinets include a security feature to send an alarm 
notification when the cabinet is unlocked. Various other alarms can be triggered 
when faults or devices are opened, which are sent to a logging server to alert 
technicians and authorities. The TBS can be in either one of two modes, namely: 
remote mode or fallback mode. TBS Fallback was discussed in the previous 
subsection and in Section 2.7.9, Chapter 2, which is the mode the TBS activates 
when the connection between a TETRA Base Station (TBS) and a Digital 
Exchange of TETRA for IP (DXT) fails.  
The following table is a summary of the evaluated security aspects which are 
related to physical, technical and operational security controls. 
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TETRA Base 
Station (TB3) 
 
Physical Security 
 
Technical Security 
Operational 
Security 
 
 
Page 39 
 
 
Encryption is used 
between TBS, 
terminals and DXT 
 
 
 
Page 51 
TBS cabinets are 
locked and require 
keys to unlock 
  
 
 
Page 51 
  
TBS cabinets send 
alarms if unlocked 
 
 
 
Page 160-
165 
 TBS can be in 
remote mode or 
fallback mode 
 
 
 
 
Page 189 
 Various fault 
detection and alerts 
sent to external 
server 
 
Table 5.7: TETRA Base Station 
Table 5.7 shows the page numbers in the TB3 course where physical, technical 
and operational security controls were discussed or mentioned. As can be seen 
from the table, there were no findings of any operational security aspects in the 
course. The following subsection will evaluate the Dispatcher Work Station course. 
 
5.3.4. Dispatcher Work Station Course (DWS) 
The Dispatcher Work Station course includes specifications about the Personal 
Computer (PC) used by the dispatcher. The DWS can only use one of two 
supporter operating systems, namely: Microsoft Windows XP Professional and 
Microsoft Windows 2000 P Professional (with no M-Audio products). The PC is 
required to have a standard mouse, keyboard, Super Video Graphics Adapter 
(SVGA) monitor, CD-ROM and a display adapter capable of a 1024x768 or higher 
resolution (EADS Defence & Security, 2009a, pp. 1-345).  
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As mentioned in the previous subsections, the DWS also supports physical 
security in the form of an optionally locked DWS device that requires a smart card 
to be inserted before the device is unlocked. The dispatchers, using DWS devices, 
can activate Ambience Listening on the DWS. Ambience Listening, as mentioned 
previously, allows the dispatcher to remotely listen to what is happening around 
the TETRA terminal, which could be used during a hostage situation. The 
dispatcher, using a DWS device, can add, remove, or move TETRA users to 
groups. Dispatchers can, therefore, remove any compromised TETRA terminals 
from sensitive group conversations. 
The following table is a summary of the evaluated security aspects which are 
related to physical, technical and operational security controls. 
Dispatcher 
Work Station 
(DWS) 
 
Physical Security 
 
Technical Security 
 
Operational 
Security 
 
 
Page 29 
DWS can be locked 
and requires a 
smart card to unlock 
  
 
 
Page 36 
 
 
DWS can configure 
what encryption 
keys to use 
 
 
 
Page 
79+Page 170 
 
 
 
 
Ambience Listening 
 
 
 
Page 105 
 
 
DWS can add, 
remove, or move 
members of a group 
 
Table 5.8: Dispatcher Work Station 
Table 5.8 shows the page numbers in the DWS course where physical, technical 
and operational security controls were discussed or mentioned. As can be seen 
from the table, there were no findings of any operational security aspects in the 
course. 
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5.3.5. Qualitative Content Summary 
The EUS, RUO, TB3 and DWS courses were qualitatively assessed for content 
relating to the objective defined in Chapter 1. The objective is to evaluate to what 
extent the current TETRA educational programme at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University (NMMU) addresses security issues. The security issues 
were aligned to physical, technical, and operational security aspects. 
Table 5.9 illustrates the findings with relation to physical, technical, and operational 
security. 
 
Course 
 
Physical 
Security 
 
Technical 
Security 
 
Operational 
Security 
Radio Unit 
Operating 
(RUO) 
 
X 
 
X 
 
End User 
System (EUS) 
 
X 
 
X 
 
TETRA Base 
Station (TB3) 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Dispatcher 
Work Station 
(DWS) 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Table 5.9: Qualitative Content Analysis of TETRA courses at NMMU 
The table illustrates that every course discusses both physical and technical 
security aspects and controls.  Therefore, the qualitative content analysis indicates 
that none of the courses discusses any operational security issues, requirements 
or recommendations.  
The results of the qualitative content analysis indicate that none of the TETRA courses 
offered at the NMMU addresses operational security, which is very reliant on human 
involvement.  As has been discussed in Section 3.5, the human factor is often the 
weakest link in technology.   
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5.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the results of the Delphi technique were discussed. Through the Delphi 
techniques, five experts in the TETRA field were consulted to assess and provide 
opinions about the plausibility of various human manipulation attack scenarios. 
Consensus, between the TETRA experts was reached with regard to the final question 
which stated that the TETRA experts agree the TETRA networks are susceptible to 
human manipulation attacks. 
The qualitative content analysis investigated the various TETRA courses offered at the 
NMMU TETRA Academy with the objective to find out to what extent security is covered 
within the programme. The TETRA courses include; Radio Unit Operating (RUO), End 
User System (EUS), TETRA Base Station (TB3) and Dispatcher Work Station (DWS) 
course. The content of these courses was investigated and any relation to physical, 
technical and operational security was noted and documented. The summary of all the 
qualitative content analysis findings concluded that each course had physical and 
technical security references, but none of the courses provided any operational security 
references. 
In conclusion, the experts believe that TETRA networks are susceptible to human 
manipulation attacks and the TETRA course material does not address any operational 
security controls or human manipulation countermeasures. Therefore, the following 
chapter will discuss a literature review about countermeasures against human 
manipulation attacks and provide guidelines that can be used by the TETRA trainer 
when offering the TETRA courses at the NMMU. 
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Chapter 6: Guidelines for the Adaptation of 
the TETRA Educational Programme to 
Address Human Behavioural Issues 
This chapter proposes guidelines for the previously highlighted issues. The guidelines 
will be aimed at the TETRA educational programme offered at the NMMU. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
Chapter 2: 
Terrestrial 
Trunked Radio
Chapter 3: The 
Human Factor of 
Information 
Security
Chapter 4: 
Research 
Methodology
Chapter 5: Output 
and Suggestions
Chapter 6: 
Guidelines
Chapter 7: 
Conclusion
 
Figure 6.1: Chapter Layout 
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 “There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard work, and learning 
from failure” – Colin Powell 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Information is vitally important for organizations and provides value, as mentioned in 
previous chapters. Therefore, information must be protected to sustain the value it 
provides to organizations. This chapter investigates existing countermeasures against 
human manipulation attacks and provides proposed Guidelines for the Adaptation of the 
TETRA Educational Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues at the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU).  
This chapter provides a brief literature review about possible countermeasures to 
human manipulation attacks, as commonly found in Information Technology (IT) 
environments. The possible countermeasures will be adapted and utilized to create 
guidelines for trainers at the NMMU TETRA Academy. The following sections will 
elaborate on the findings of the literature review and discuss the guidelines for TETRA 
trainers. 
 
6.2. Operational Countermeasures 
As a result of the Delphi technique, as discussed in Chapter 5, human manipulation 
attacks was identified as a potential problem in a TETRA environment. The initial 
problem was identified by comparing the common threat of social engineering and 
corruption of an IT environment to a TETRA network, which was identified as the human 
factor (Fouché & Thomson, 2011). Therefore, after proving that the human factor could 
be regarded as the weakest link in a TETRA environment, through the literature review, 
Delphi technique, and qualitative content analysis, the countermeasures used in an IT 
environment must be investigated to potentially provide a solution for human 
manipulation attacks in TETRA networks. 
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The core aspect of an exploit, that involves human manipulation attacks, is the 
employee. The employee, along with his/her personal characteristics, is the target of the 
manipulation attack (Beaver, 2010, pp. 61-62). A victim rarely realizes that they have 
been manipulated to exploit their network due to the innovative methods used by the 
attacker, as discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, it is difficult to protect employees of an 
organization against a human manipulation attack. In order to protect the employee, the 
employees of an organization must be prepared to recognize these types of attacks and 
understand how valuable even the smallest detail of information is. Furthermore, a 
specific program should be required, which can allow the employee to realize when a 
possible attack is happening or when an attack scenario could escalate into a 
successful attack (Klevinsky, Laliberte, & Gupta, 2002, pp. 123-124; Roper, Fischer, & 
Grau, 2006, pp. 2-3; Whitman & Mattord, 2011, p. 209; Kee, 2008; NIST 800-50, 2003). 
This information security programme in an IT environment consists of three programme 
elements, namely: 
 Information Security Awareness; 
NIST Special Publication 800-16 defines information security awareness as a 
programme which consists of awareness presentations, which are used to focus 
attention on security. The awareness presentations are “intended to allow individuals 
to recognize IT security concerns and respond accordingly” (NIST 800-16, 1998). 
Awareness fulfils the goal of keeping the idea of information security in the minds of 
users and stimulates the users to regard security as important (Whitman & Mattord, 
2011, p. 210).  
 Information Security Training; 
NIST Special Publication 800-16 defines security training as a programme that 
strives to produce relevant and needed security skills and competencies (NIST 800-
16, 1998). Security training provides users with detailed information and hands-on 
instruction to prepare them to perform their duties securely (Whitman & Mattord, 
2011, p. 210). 
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 and, Information Security Education. 
NIST Special Publication 800-16 defines security education as the integration of all 
the security skills and competencies of various functional specialties into a common 
body of knowledge. This programme strives to produce IT security specialists and 
professionals who are capable of vision and have a proactive response to threats, 
which are typically aimed at human manipulation (NIST 800-16, 1998). Not every 
employee requires formal education about information security. However, the 
employees who do require security education could receive formal education about 
information security at higher education institutions (Whitman & Mattord, 2011, p. 
210). 
The three programmes discussed include notable differences from each other, such as 
answering different question attributes, providing different results, seeking different 
objectives and affecting people over different time periods. Table 6.1 indicates the 
differences between the programs. 
 Awareness Training Education 
Question Attribute What? How? Why? 
Result Information Knowledge Insight 
Objective Exposure Skill Understanding 
Timeframe Impact Short term Intermediate term Long term 
Table 6.1: Programme Differences (adapted from Whitman & Mattord (2011, p. 209)) 
The three programmes, Awareness, Training, and Education, apply to IT environments, 
but can be related to any environment that is threatened by human manipulation 
attacks. Therefore, these programmes could potentially apply to TETRA networks and 
the users of a TETRA network. Ideally, TETRA users, who are at risk of human 
manipulation attacks, should, at a minimum, be exposed to information security 
awareness components while attending TETRA training at the NMMU TETRA 
Academy. Therefore, the proposed guidelines will focus primarily on information security 
awareness components. The following section will elaborate on the high level guidelines 
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overview, which could aid the NMMU TETRA trainers into developing information 
security components for inclusion into the TETRA educational programme.  
 
6.3. High Level Guidelines Overview 
The following high level guidelines provide an overview of the recommendations, which 
will be detailed in Section 6.4. Each high level guideline in Table 6.2 is sequential and 
contains further details about the guideline itself.  These high level guidelines are based 
on an information security awareness plan from ENISA, which has been adapted and 
revised to address the requirements for the NMMU TETRA trainers (ENISA, 2007, pp. 
109-111). 
 
High Level Guidelines Overview 
Number Guideline Details 
1 Plan and organize Assess what considerations and preparations are 
required to make TETRA trainees aware of human 
manipulation attacks. Set clear goals and objectives 
to focus on throughout the rest of the guidelines. 
Additionally, create a communication plan, which will 
involve planning how information messages will be 
transferred to the TETRA trainees. 
2 Collaborate with other institutions Collaboration with other TETRA training facilities 
could give more exposure to the objectives of these 
guidelines to make TETRA trainees aware of human 
manipulation attacks. 
3 Utilize multiple communication 
channels (specific and effective) 
Investigate possible communication channels that 
could be beneficial to relay the security messages to 
TETRA trainees. The channels could include specific 
channels, such as online websites and physical 
posters in the TETRA Academy, or could include 
channels, such as brochures, stickers for TETRA 
terminals and wallpaper/screensavers for DWS 
computers. 
  
111 
Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to Address 
Human Behavioural Issues 
4 Tailor messages to be meaningful Investigate security messages for TETRA trainees 
and tailor the messages to be meaningful to the 
target TETRA trainees. Material on common human 
manipulation attacks in the IT environment could be 
adapted and related to the TETRA environment and 
should be tailored to be correctly perceived by a 
specific group of TETRA trainees. 
5 Categorize specific objectives and 
messages for each type of group 
Categorize the different groups of TETRA trainees 
and, where possible, customize the security 
messages and communication channels to the 
optimal requirements for each categorized group. 
This categorization can allow faster preparation for 
the TETRA trainer training future TETRA trainees of 
a similar categorized group. 
6 Develop meaningful material The information, such as terms and definitions, 
should remain meaningful for the intended target 
group of TETRA trainees. Material on common 
human manipulation attacks in the IT environment 
should be properly adapted to be relevant for the 
TETRA trainees. 
7 Continuous awareness New and more innovative human manipulation 
attacks are continuously being developed, which 
means the awareness thereof should be continuous 
as well. Ongoing information security awareness is 
vitally important for the security of TETRA trainees 
against human manipulation attacks.  
Table 6.2: High Level Guidelines Overview 
These high level guidelines should be considered by an NMMU TETRA trainer before 
using the proposed guidelines in the following section. 
 
6.4. Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational 
Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues 
The proposed „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to 
Address Human Behavioural Issues‟ provided in this section are intended to be used by 
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trainers at the NMMU TETRA Academy. The proposed guidelines are not intended to 
be all-encompassing, but should serve as guidance to trainers that wish to enhance 
security for TETRA trainees. Therefore, other TETRA training facilities and future 
TETRA Academies could potentially also utilize the guidelines of this section. These 
guidelines are based on an information security awareness programme and guidelines 
from ENISA and have been adapted and revised to address the requirements of the 
TETRA trainers (ENISA, 2007, pp. 111-117).  It must be noted that, unlike an 
information security awareness programme in the IT environment, the information 
security awareness components highlighted by the guidelines should be integrated into 
the existing TETRA courses outlined in Chapter 5. Therefore, TETRA trainees would 
not have to attend an additional information security awareness programme, but would 
be made aware of the potential for human manipulation attacks and how to recognize 
them as part of the courses they attend. It must also be noted that the proposed 
guidelines do not address the development of information security related policies and 
procedures. It is the responsibility of each organization to create the necessary 
information security policies and procedures to be used by employees and, therefore, it 
will not be covered in the proposed guidelines. 
The following Figure 6.2 represents the „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA 
Educational Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues‟ and the sequence that 
should be followed. 
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Phase 1: Plan and Assess
1.7 Change management 
approach
1.6 Obtain support and funding
1.4 Identify required material
1.5 Prepare working plan
1.1 Define goals and objectives
1.2 Define groups
1.3 Define required tasks
1.8 Establish baseline for 
evaluation
1.9 Document lessons learned
Phase 2: Execute and Manage Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust
2.1 Review the working plan
2.2 Launch and implement the 
tasks
2.3 Broadcast communication
2.4 Document lessons learned
3.1 Conduct evaluations
3.2 Review goals and objectives
3.3 Evaluate lessons learned
3.4 Re-launch and re-
implement tasks
 
Figure 6.2: Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to Address Human 
Behavioural Issues (adapted from ENISA (2007)) 
As can be seen from the figure, there are three different phases, namely, Phase 1: Plan 
and Assess, Phase 2: Execute and Manage, and Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust. Each 
phase has a number of tasks that should be completed before moving to the next 
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phase. For example, when all the tasks of Phase 1: Plan and Assess have been 
completed then the tasks of Phase 2: Execute and Manage can be started.  It should 
also be noted, that the final task of Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust is „Re-launch and Re-
implement Tasks‟. This indicates the cyclical nature of the guidelines. Most of the tasks 
in each of the Phases are connected to another task in another Phase. For example, 
„1.1 Define goals and objectives‟ is linked to „2.1 Review the working plan‟. This 
indicates that task 1.1 should be completed before moving on to task 2.1. 
The following subsections will discuss Figure 6.2 in more detail, including all three 
phases and the details of each of the tasks in the phases. 
 
6.4.1. Phase 1: Plan and Assess 
Phase 1: Plan and Assess consists of the initial tasks that should be conducted by 
the TETRA trainer to prepare for information security awareness training. The 
guidelines do not prescribe exactly what the contents of the information security 
awareness programme should be or how the information security awareness 
programme should be conducted. However, it does detail the tasks required for the 
preparation and execution of the information security awareness programme. The 
details of every task will be further discussed in the following Table 6.3. 
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Phase 1: Plan and Assess 
Number Guideline Details 
1.1 Define goals and objectives Investigated, assess and define the goals and 
objectives for making TETRA trainees security 
aware. The goals and objectives allow the 
TETRA trainer to remain focused. For example, 
the goal is to keep the threat of human 
manipulation attacks foremost in the minds of 
the TETRA trainees, throughout the duration of 
the TETRA course, as well as in the trainees‟ 
working environments. A further goal could be to 
teach the TETRA trainees the necessary skills 
to ensure the trainees are aware of human 
manipulation attacks. 
1.2 Define groups Defining the specific group of TETRA trainees is 
vitally important to relay the correct security 
message and ensure the awareness of human 
manipulation attacks. Each group will have 
trainees with the same role in their working 
environment, which includes unique interests 
and needs. Each existing TETRA course offered 
at the NMMU is targeted at specific TETRA 
users.  For example, police officers would attend 
the TETRA RUO course.  Police dispatchers 
would attend the TETRA DWS course.  
Therefore, the information security awareness 
aspects can be tailored to specific groups.  
1.3 Define required tasks Assess and define the correct required tasks for 
each group of TETRA trainees that are 
attempting a specific TETRA course. The key 
security messages, which relate to the specific 
groups, should be highlighted and the trainees 
should be made aware of human manipulation 
attacks. These required tasks will be added to 
the working plan, in guideline 1.5, which will be 
used in Phase 2: Execute and Manage. The 
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tasks could, for example, include teaching 
TETRA TB3 trainees to only accept authorized 
tasks from authorized personnel. 
1.4 Identify required material Assess and identify requirements for material 
content that is necessary for the communication 
channels. Investigate human manipulation 
attacks, which are commonly found in the IT 
environment, which can be related to TETRA 
environment. Investigate countermeasures 
against these human manipulation attacks and 
develop solution ideas which can be provided to 
TETRA trainees against human manipulation 
attacks. For example, known countermeasures 
against social engineering can be adapted and 
utilized in a TETRA environment. 
1.5 Prepare working plan Start constructing a working plan to make the 
TETRA trainees aware of human manipulation 
attacks. This could include using, for example, 
posters and trinkets with security messages. In 
addition, teaching the trainees the necessary 
skills to protect themselves against human 
manipulation attacks, such as never handing 
over TETRA equipment to unauthorized 
personnel. The working plan could include, for 
example, altering the existing slides or adding to 
the existing slides of the TETRA courses to 
make the trainees aware of human manipulation 
attacks. 
1.6 Obtain support and funding Seek support from fellow TETRA trainers, from 
the same institution or from others, and seek 
support from proper management channels in 
the institution. Funding is also required, due to, 
for example, the expense of communication 
channels such as posters and websites. 
1.7 Change management approach Investigate a possible change management 
methodology, for the current TETRA courses at 
the TETRA Academy, which will ensure the 
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objectives for the target group of TETRA 
trainees will be reached. The change 
management approach will aid in adopting the 
necessary requirements for TETRA trainers to 
make the TETRA trainees aware of human 
manipulation attacks.  
1.8 Establish baseline for 
evaluation 
Create a survey, which can be used as a 
baseline metric, with indicators to be used for 
evaluation purposes in a later phase of the 
guidelines. The survey can include, for example, 
a competency test of fictional attack scenarios 
to test if the TETRA trainees are adequately 
prepared against human manipulation attacks. 
Such a test will, for example, only be 
implemented towards the end of the specific 
TETRA course in Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust. 
1.9 Document lessons learned Capture all relevant findings and lessons 
learned in proper documentation and file the 
documentation for future use.  The lessons 
learned are based on the activities during this 
Phase 1: Plan and Assess of the guidelines. 
Table 6.3: Phase 1: Plan and Assess (adapted from ENISA (2007)) 
The guidelines provided in this subsection allow the TETRA trainer to design an 
optimal working plan for the TETRA course and the TETRA trainees. The following 
phases of the guidelines are to be utilized by the TETRA trainer once the Plan and 
Assess phase has been successfully completed. The following section will discuss 
Phase 2: Execute and Manage of the proposed guidelines. 
 
6.4.2. Phase 2: Execute and Manage 
Phase 2: Execute and Manage allows the TETRA trainer to put all the plans and 
assessments from Phase 1 into action in the live TETRA training environment. The 
working plan, and all of its defined tasks, should be executed to provide the 
TETRA trainees with the necessary exposure to information security awareness of 
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human manipulation attacks, as well as teachings to aid the trainees in securing 
themselves against human manipulation attacks. The following Table 6.4 will 
discuss the details of each task in Phase 2: Execute and Manage. 
Phase 2: Execute and Manage 
Number Guideline Details 
2.1 Review the working plan The working plan must be reviewed and the 
latest findings based on the goals and objectives 
for securing TETRA trainees against human 
manipulation attacks must be updated. New and 
innovative methods for relaying the security 
message and teaching security skills could be 
added and/or replaced in the current working 
plan. For example, new findings with regard to 
human manipulation attacks could be included in 
the TETRA course slides for a specific group of 
TETRA trainees. 
2.2 Launch and implement the tasks The TETRA trainer must implement the prepared 
tasks of the working plan and remain focused on 
the goals and objectives, as defined in Phase 1: 
Plan and Assess, while carrying out these tasks. 
The tasks include the examples provided in the 
previous tasks of this phase and Phase 1: Plan 
and Assess. 
2.3 Broadcast communication The identified proper communication channels 
should be utilized to relay the security messages 
and teachings of skills for TETRA trainees. 
General information security awareness material 
can also be forwarded to partnering institutions 
and supporting staff to aid in distributing the 
security messages. 
2.4 Document lessons learned Capture all relevant findings and lessons learned 
in proper documentation for future use.  The 
lessons learned are based on the execution of 
the tasks of the working plan.  
Table 6.4: Phase 2: Execute and Manage (adapted from ENISA (2007)) 
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The guidelines provided in this subsection should allow the TETRA trainer to 
successfully implement the tasks planned in Phase 1: Plan and Assess. The 
correct communication channels should be utilized and the tasks should be 
performed by the TETRA trainer to provide the TETRA trainees with necessary 
security against human manipulation attacks. 
 
6.4.3. Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust Phase 
Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust is the final set of tasks of the guidelines and 
attempts to reflect on the changes made by the tasks performed by the TETRA 
trainer. This reflection would allow the TETRA trainer to evaluate if adequate 
information security awareness was conveyed and to assess what adjustments 
should be made to improve the security against human manipulation attacks on 
the TETRA trainees. The following Table 6.4 will discuss the details of each task in 
Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust. 
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Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust 
Number Guideline Details 
3.1 Conduct evaluations The survey created in Phase 1: Plan and 
Assess should be utilized to measure the 
effectiveness in raising awareness and teaching 
the necessary skills to TETRA trainees against 
human manipulation attacks. Conduct the 
survey, which allows measurements to be made 
on the influence of the information security 
awareness techniques on the TETRA trainees. 
For example, fictional attack scenarios could be 
provided in the survey to evaluate the 
information security awareness of the TETRA 
trainees. 
3.2 Review goals and objectives As a result of the evaluations conducted in 3.1, 
the goals and objectives should be revisited, 
which were defined in Phase 1: Plan and 
Assess , to ensure the goals and objectives will 
guide and focus the TETRA trainers in the 
successful direction of securing TETRA trainees 
against human manipulation attacks.  
3.3 Evaluate lessons learned Evaluate the documented lessons learned from 
Phase 1: Plan and Assess and the Phase 2: 
Execute and Manage to assess the findings for 
the specific groups and the working plan. This 
includes the evaluation from the survey. 
3.4 Re-launch and re-implement 
tasks 
After evaluating the lessons learned and refining 
the working plan, the working plan should be re-
launched and the tasks re-implemented, where 
necessary.  
Table 6.5: Phase 3: Evaluate and Adjust (adapted from ENISA (2007)) 
The guidelines provided in this subsection allow the TETRA trainer to reflect 
whether the information security awareness messages and security skills were 
successfully provided to the TETRA trainees. This also allows the TETRA trainer 
to revise additional details and adjust tasks where necessary.   
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The guidelines provided in this section allow TETRA trainers to prepare for making 
TETRA trainees at the NMMU TETRA Academy aware of human manipulation attacks 
and the effect these attacks could have on a TETRA network. As mentioned previously, 
the guidelines are not all-encompassing and should be interpreted by the TETRA trainer 
to be utilized in the most effective way. The guidelines allow the TETRA trainer to plan 
for the requirements, execute the planned tasks and evaluate if the information security 
awareness components are effective for the TETRA trainees.  
 
6.5. Evaluation of the Guidelines 
The „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to Address 
Human Behavioural Issues‟, provided in the previous section, are aimed at guiding 
TETRA trainers to develop information security awareness components to be included 
in the TETRA educational programme to make TETRA trainees aware of potential 
human manipulation attacks in a TETRA environment. The guidelines are aimed at the 
NMMU TETRA Academy and were, therefore, evaluated by TETRA trainers at the 
NMMU TETRA Academy. This section will present the results of the Elite Interviews 
conducted to evaluate the proposed „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA 
Educational Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues‟. 
The Elite Interview is performed in four steps; constructs and questions, sampling, 
collecting data, and analysis (Beamer, 2002). The following paragraphs will discuss how 
these steps were performed. 
 Constructs and Questions; 
The aim of the Elite Interview is to provide evaluation of the proposed solution, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 4.6. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous 
section, the proposed solution is in the form of guidelines for TETRA trainers. 
Therefore, questions were constructed to determine if the respondents are 
knowledgeable in the TETRA environment and to determine if the respondents 
easily understand the proposed solution. Additionally, the respondents were 
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encouraged to provide recommendations to improve the solution and to determine if 
the proposed solution could assist TETRA trainers in incorporating information 
security awareness components into the applicable TETRA courses at the NMMU 
TETRA Academy. 
 Sampling; 
The respondents chosen are TETRA trainers at the NMMU TETRA Academy, who 
are also lecturers in the Faculty of Engineering, the Built Environment and 
Information Technology at the NMMU. The respondents are kept anonymous, as per 
agreement of confidentiality and to remove constraints of possible social pressure in 
answering the constructed questions. Two respondents were selected from the 
available list of TETRA trainers at the NMMU TETRA Academy. 
 Collecting Data; 
The Elite Interview was conducted via electronic mail (email), utilizing the previously 
mentioned constructed questions. The Word document in Appendix C was created 
and emailed to each respondent individually.  
 and, Analysis. 
The feedback was gathered electronically and will be further discussed in Section 
6.5.2. 
The discussed steps allowed an Elite Interview to be conducted and provided valid and 
unique data resources, which were utilized for evaluation purposes (Beamer, 2002). 
The following section will discuss the construction of the Elite Interview, along with the 
document used, in further detail. 
 
6.5.1. Elite Interview Construction 
As mentioned previously, the Elite Interview was conducted electronically and the 
document in Appendix C was created to provide information about the study, the 
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confidentiality agreement and further details about the Elite Interview for the 
respondent.  
The respondents were presented with the „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the 
TETRA Educational Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues‟, followed 
by details about each phase in the guidelines, as discussed in Section 6.4. Each 
respondent was then asked the following questions: 
 Background Information; 
The respondents were presented with questions regarding the amount of years 
involved in the TETRA environment, along with how long the respondent has 
been a TETRA trainer at the NMMU TETRA Academy. Additional questions 
were included, such as the amount of years the respondents have been a 
lecturer at the NMMU institution, how knowledgeable the respondent regards 
himself/herself with TETRA training and how confident the respondent regards 
himself/herself about answering questions involving TETRA training at the 
NMMU TETRA Academy.  
 Guidelines Evaluation; 
The respondents were presented with questions regarding the „Guidelines for 
the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to Address Human 
Behavioural Issues‟. The questions included if the respondents believe the 
guidelines are easily understandable and if the respondents have any 
recommendations towards changing the guidelines. The respondents were also 
asked if the guidelines could potentially assist them in incorporating information 
security awareness components into the applicable TETRA courses. 
 and, Additional Comments. 
The respondents were provided with the possibility to provide additional 
comments regarding the Elite Interview and the „Guidelines for the Adaptation 
of the TETRA Educational Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues‟. 
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The document, along with the constructed questions and proposed guidelines, 
were sent to each of the selected TETRA trainers. The documents were retrieved 
from each of the respondents and will be further discussed in the following 
subsection. 
 
6.5.2. Elite Interview Feedback 
The respondents answered the questions of the Elite Interview by providing the 
following information: 
 Background Information; 
Respondent A indicated that he/she had 1 – 5 years of involvement in the 
TETRA environment and also indicated 1 – 5 years of involvement as a TETRA 
trainer at the NMMU TETRA Academy. Respondent A indicated that he/she had 
15 or more years of experience as a lecturer at the NMMU institution. 
Additionally, Respondent A agreed that he/she was knowledgeable with regard 
to TETRA training and was confident in his/her ability to answer questions 
about TETRA training at the NMMU TETRA Academy. 
Respondent B indicated that he/she had 1 – 5 years of involvement in the 
TETRA environment and also indicated 1 – 5 years of involvement as a TETRA 
trainer at the NMMU TETRA Academy. Respondent B indicated that he/she had 
11 – 15 years of experience as a lecturer at the NMMU institution. Additionally, 
Respondent B strongly agreed that he/she was knowledgeable with regard to 
TETRA training and was confident in his/her ability to answer questions about 
TETRA training at the NMMU TETRA Academy. 
 Guidelines Evaluation; 
Respondent A agreed that the guidelines are easily understandable and that 
he/she does not have any recommendations towards changing the guidelines. 
Respondent A also indicated that the guidelines will assist him/her in 
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incorporating information security awareness components into the applicable 
TETRA courses. 
Respondent B agreed that the guidelines are easily understandable and 
provided an additional comment that the guidelines address security concerns 
which are common and well established. Respondent B commented that it 
makes sense to apply the guidelines in the TETRA environment. Respondent B 
indicated that he/she does not have any recommendations towards changing 
the guidelines and provided an additional comment that the guidelines appear 
to cover all the foreseeable required components. Respondent B also indicated 
that the guidelines will assist him/her in incorporating information security 
awareness components into the applicable TETRA courses and provided an 
additional comment that the guidelines provide a structure to help make the 
TETRA trainees aware of the social engineering threats to TETRA security. 
Both respondents agreed that the „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA 
Educational Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues‟ will assist the 
respondents in incorporating information security awareness components into 
the applicable TETRA courses at the NMMU TETRA Academy. 
 and, Additional Comments. 
The respondents did not indicate any additional comments in the Elite 
Interview. 
Through the Elite Interview, the proposed „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA 
Educational Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues‟, were evaluated by the 
NMMU TETRA trainers. These trainers indicated that the proposed guidelines could 
assist them in developing information security components that could make TETRA 
trainees aware of the potential human manipulation attacks in a TETRA environment. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
The information discussed in this chapter elaborates on information security awareness 
against human manipulation attacks and the relationship of these attacks with TETRA 
networks. A security programme is discussed in a literature review, which is commonly 
utilized in Information Technology (IT) environment; however, as discussed in Section 
6.2 and previous chapters, this can be related to any environment. The discussed 
information security awareness programme was adapted into guidelines that are aimed 
at TETRA trainers at the NMMU TETRA Academy. 
The literature review provided three types of security programmes; Awareness, 
Training, and Education. The three programmes were discussed in detail and 
information security awareness was selected to be the focus for the TETRA trainers, as 
awareness is seen as the foundation for information security. In preparation for using 
the guidelines, the TETRA trainer should refer to the High Level Guidelines Overview in 
Section 6.3. 
The proposed „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to 
Address Human Behavioural Issues‟ were created by adapting an information security 
awareness programme from ENISA to address the requirements for the NMMU TETRA 
trainers. The guidelines consist of three phases, namely; Plan and Assess, Execute and 
Manage, and Evaluate and Adjust. These phases would allow the TETRA trainer to 
design an optimal working plan, to successfully implement the planned tasks and to 
reflect whether the information security awareness messages were successfully 
provided to the TETRA trainees. These guidelines attempt to guide the TETRA trainer in 
the intended direction so that the TETRA trainer can make the TETRA trainees aware of 
human manipulation attacks. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter draws conclusions from the conducted research and serves as the final 
chapter of this dissertation. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
Chapter 2: 
Terrestrial 
Trunked Radio
Chapter 3: The 
Human Factor of 
Information 
Security
Chapter 4: 
Research 
Methodology
Chapter 5: Output 
and Suggestions
Chapter 6: 
Guidelines
Chapter 7: 
Conclusion
 
Table 7.1: Chapter Layout 
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“Success consists of going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm” – Winston 
Churchill 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters elaborated on Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) network 
devices and the potential of such a network to be threatened by human manipulation 
attacks. The human manipulation attacks were derived from information security in a 
typical Information Technology (IT) environment, which resulted in guidance to find 
helpful countermeasures against human manipulation attacks that could be related to 
TETRA networks.  
The following section discusses how the research objectives were met. 
 
7.2. Evaluation of Research Outcomes 
The primary research objective was to provide guidelines that could be used to address 
the human factor in the TETRA educational programme offered at Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University. To address this primary research objective, a number of 
secondary objectives were defined. This section will address the secondary objectives, 
which were defined in Chapter 1, Section 1.4. 
 
Research Objective: Investigate susceptibility of TETRA networks to human 
manipulation attacks commonly used to exploit vulnerabilities in IT environments. 
A Delphi technique was prepared to assess the susceptibility of TETRA networks 
to human manipulation attacks, which was related from common IT environments. 
The Delphi technique indicated that the TETRA experts had mixed opinions about 
technical and human based deception attack scenarios, but firmly agreed that a 
corruption manipulation attack scenario was highly plausible. A consensus was 
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reached with regard to the final question in the Delphi technique, „Do you believe 
TETRA networks are susceptible to human manipulation techniques, which are 
commonly used to exploit vulnerabilities in IT environments?‟  The TETRA experts 
agreed that this was highly plausible.  
Therefore, the TETRA experts, identified in the Delphi technique, believed that 
TETRA networks are susceptible to human manipulation attacks. This objective 
was achieved in Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
 
Research Objective: Investigate the extent to which the current TETRA 
educational programme at the NMMU addresses security issues. 
A qualitative content analysis was conducted to investigate the extent to which the 
current TETRA educational programme addresses security issues. The qualitative 
content analysis included any findings that were related to physical, technical and 
operational security controls and were documented. The conclusion of the 
qualitative content analysis indicated that each TETRA course offered at the 
NMMU TETRA Academy included some details about physical and technical 
security controls. However, none of the courses addressed operational security 
controls.  
Therefore, this objective was achieved in Chapter 5, Section 5.3, by concluding 
that the TETRA educational programme at the NMMU does not provide any 
information highlighting operational security controls, which indicates that the issue 
of human manipulation attacks is not addressed. 
 
Research Objective: Investigate countermeasures currently addressing human 
factors in IT environments. 
A literature review was conducted to investigate countermeasures used in IT 
environments that address human manipulation attacks. The literature review 
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indicated that specific security programmes are used to aid employees against 
human manipulation attacks, which include Awareness, Training and Education 
programmes. These were discussed in detail and information security awareness 
was primarily utilized to create the solution of the research problem statement, as 
awareness is, arguably, the foundation for information security.  
Therefore, this objective was achieved in Chapter 6, where a literature review 
provided information of a security programme against human manipulation attacks 
used in IT environments.  
 
Research Objective: Evaluate the applicability of identified countermeasures 
used in the IT environment, in addressing the human factor in TETRA networks. 
One of the countermeasures used in the IT environment and identified through the 
previous research objective was an information security awareness programme. 
Guidelines for the development of information security awareness components to 
be included in the TETRA educational programme were developed and the 
applicability of these guidelines was evaluated through an Elite Interview. The Elite 
Interview indicated that all respondents believe the proposed guidelines and 
related details are easily understandable and can assist a TETRA trainer in 
incorporating information security awareness components into the applicable 
TETRA courses. The respondents did not have any recommendations to improve 
the proposed guidelines. 
Therefore, this objective was achieved in Chapter 6, where an Elite Interview 
provided the feedback from NMMU TETRA trainers who evaluated the proposed 
guidelines. 
In addition to these secondary objectives, the primary objective of suggesting guidelines 
to address the human factor in the NMMU TETRA educational programme was met 
through the „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to 
Address Human Behavioural Issues‟ provided in Chapter 6. The guidelines are to be 
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used by the TETRA trainers at the NMMU to guide them in the development of 
information security awareness components to be included in the existing TETRA 
educational programme at the NMMU in an attempt to address the human factor of 
TETRA.  
 
7.3. Directions for Future Research 
This research proposed „Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Education 
Programme to Address Human Behavioural Issues‟. These guidelines are aimed at the 
TETRA trainers at the NMMU to assist them with the development of information 
security awareness components to be included in the current TETRA courses as part of 
the TETRA educational programme. There remain, however, aspects of the guidelines 
that could be investigated further. This section will outline the areas for future research. 
The guidelines could be utilized by TETRA trainers at the NMMU in the development of 
information security awareness components to be included in TETRA courses. 
Research could be conducted to investigate what the content of the information security 
awareness components should be, as the proposed guidelines do not prescribe the 
content for the components. Through the development of these components, aspects of 
the guidelines could be refined for future use and possible use in other TETRA 
Academies throughout the world. Additionally, the guidelines could be adapted to 
address specific sectors, for example, Public Safety and Security (PSS) versus 
transportation. 
Additionally, a pre- and post-survey could be conducted with TETRA trainees with 
regard to their information security awareness to determine whether the implemented 
information security awareness components are effective. 
 
 
 
  
132 Conclusion 
7.4. Epilogue 
Information is communicated through various mediums within organizations. Different 
organizations use different mediums to fulfil the requirements of their own unique 
environment. However, every organization shares the same need to protect its 
information. As mentioned in previous chapters, information is vitally important to 
organizations and should be protected to retain the value it provides for the 
organization. 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) has been discussed and identified as a secured 
communication medium, with regard to physical and technical controls. However, 
TETRA users are still at risk of being exploited by operational security threats, such as 
human manipulation attacks. 
The TETRA educational programme offered at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University does not address any operational security measures. To address this, 
„Guidelines for the Adaptation of the TETRA Educational Programme to Address 
Human Behavioural Issues‟ were suggested for TETRA trainers at the NMMU. The 
TETRA trainers could use these guidelines to prepare a working plan for addressing the 
awareness of threats to operational security and develop information security 
awareness components to be included in the TETRA educational programme. Guidance 
is also provided for implementing the working plan and tasks, while also guiding the 
TETRA trainer to evaluate the effectiveness of the working plan. 
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Appendix A: Published Article 
 
This Appendix includes the paper entitled; „Exploring the Human Dimension of TETRA‟, 
which was presented at the 2011 Information Security South Africa (ISSA) conference, 
which was held in Johannesburg. The article denotes a relationship between 
Information Technology (IT) social engineering attacks and similar social engineering 
attack scenarios in a TETRA environment. 
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Appendix B: Delphi Technique 
 
This Appendix includes the results of the Delphi technique. The first round included a 
questionnaire, which was published on a web site and sent to the TETRA experts. The 
results of the first round include an Excel Spreadsheet with the names blacked out to 
keep the TETRA experts anonymous. 
The second round included a Word document, which was sent to the TETRA experts for 
them to complete. The Word document included the feedback from the other 
anonymous TETRA experts. 
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Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
This Appendix includes the documents received from the TETRA trainers, who 
participated in the Elite Interview. The documents include feedback from two TETRA 
trainers at the NMMU TETRA Academy and the names are blacked out for anonymity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
213 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
214 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
215 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
216 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
217 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
218 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
219 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
220 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
221 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
222 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
223 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
224 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
225 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
226 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
227 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
228 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
229 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
230 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
231 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
232 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
233 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
234 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
  
235 Appendix C: Elite Interview 
 
